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ABSTRACT 
United States President Barack Obama issued an Executive order on November 20, 2014 
to implement new law regarding the American immigration system and deportations. The 
system has long been skewed, and a polarizing issue among both the general public and 
of those involved in the United States government. Obama, by issuing this decree, created 
a law on his own due to congressional deadlock in creating and passing immigration 
reform legislation. However, the constitutionality of his decision to do so has now 
become highly debated, with many officials and academics across the country asserting 
their beliefs in his legal ability to issue the order. The ability to create laws is explicitly 
prescribed to the Legislative branch in the Constitution, but there have been past 
examples of Executive authority being necessary so as to preserve the Union and allow 
the government to continue. This thesis will examine the constitutionality of Obama’s 
Executive decree and the potential precedent that it will set for future Presidents by 
analyzing it within the context of John Locke, the original proprietor for the rule of law, 
James Madison, the father of the United States Constitution and separation of powers 
system, Alexander Hamilton, the forthcoming advocate for an energetic Executive of the 
Founding Fathers, the Abraham Lincoln presidency, which involved the crisis known as 
the Civil War, and the George W. Bush presidency, widely known as one of the most 
polarizing constitutional presidencies in American history. When looking at these past 
examples it becomes clear that Barack Obama overstepped his place in the government 
with no existential crisis threatening the nation, therefore setting a dangerous precedent 
for future Executive’s as well as damaging the force of the separation of powers system.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The growth of partisanship in the United States of America’s political 
environment has been well documented over the last seventy-five years, and at this point, 
the divide has arrived at its peak. Political deadlocks between different branches of 
government and inability to pass legal policy have created frustrations on all sides of the 
spectrum, as the separation of powers principles that the country’s constitutional 
framework is based upon has created a significant number of ways to stop the passing of 
legislation and Executive activity. A now Republican-controlled Congress and a 
democratic presidential administration that has been one of the more polarizing 
administrations in United States history have resulted in a lack of production in a time 
when production seems to be absolutely necessary to solving the nation’s issues. 
Currently at the forefront of this deadlock is immigration law, as there have been 
numerous issues regarding the temporary protection from deportation for illegal 
immigrants, and particularly the children born in America, those with jobs, clean records, 
and strong community ties. These children were brought to America by their 
undocumented parents, and therefore were not given the choice of arriving illegally, 
while the others have integrated themselves as productive and valuable members of 
society. The official number of people in this category is unknown, but some news 
outlets, such as the New York Times, have estimated that there are between four and five 
million1, which is over a third of the total undocumented resident population (11 
1 New York Times Editorial Board, “Mr. Obama, Your Move”, The New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/10/opinion/sunday/mr-obama-your-move.html?_r=0, , August 9, 2014 
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million2) in the United States today. While this may not be a huge portion of the total 
population, most of these people are centered around a few major metropolitan hubs, are 
prominent and contributing members of their communities, and have faced a large 
amount of hardships to get to where they are with the disadvantages that are inherently 
given to undocumented immigrants.  
Not only do these immigrants play roles in the country, but citizens of the United 
States have also taken up a vested interest in immigration law, primarily because of the 
value undocumented immigrants provide in the workforce, civil rights activity, and in 
exposing inefficient law enforcement. There is a large amount of wastefulness occurring 
in the enforcement of deportations, as they chase millions of people who pose no threat 
and help keep the economy afloat by working jobs that the general citizenry avoid at 
almost all costs while not complaining about wages and unfair working conditions3. 
There are massive civil rights abuses that expose the prevalence of racism in the United 
States today, and the increased publicity for occurrences of racial profiling towards those 
that should be deemed innocent has made this more obvious to the general population4. 
In addition, because a lot of the undocumented immigrants, whether they are valuable or 
not, fear law enforcement even if they’ve done nothing illegal, ripe conditions for crime 
and exploitation flourish wherever they remain hidden5. With all of these issues 
achieving national prominence because of President Obama’s 2012 program that deferred 
2 Nakamura, David, “Obama Readies Executive Action on Immigration”, Washington Post, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-readies-executive-action-to-legalize-millions-of-
undocumented-immigrants/2014/08/01/222ae2e8-18f8-11e4-85b6-c1451e622637_story.html, August 1, 
2014 
3 New York Times Editorial Board, “Mr. Obama, Your Move” 
4 New York Times Editorial Board, “Mr. Obama, Your Move” 
5 New York Times Editorial Board, “Mr. Obama, Your Move” 
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deportations of many immigrants who had been brought to the country illegally as 
children6, Congress reallocating resources for Obama to deport 350,000 to 400,000 
undocumented immigrants per year7, and the social stands that undocumented children 
under the age of 18 (most of whom are not criminals, drug dealers, violent or non-violent 
offenders, and are simply trying to escape the dangers and threats of their home 
countries) have been taking by turning themselves over to immigration authorities8, a 
massive pressure from multiple directions is continuously rising on the federal 
government to act upon reforming immigration law. However, the previous divide in 
Congress (now controlled by the GOP) and differences between Congress and the 
presidential administration, as mentioned before, are blocking legislation from being 
passed. 
The ridiculous sums of money spent on border patrolling have also contributed to 
the idea of reforming the system, as the government allocated $11.7 billion to border 
security in 2012, which is an extremely high number during the recovery from a financial 
crisis9. Furthermore, Mexico, adjacent to the United States, in terms of domestic 
immigration law governing their potential immigrants, is treated under the same rules and 
regulations as Switzerland in the center of Europe10. The current immigration quotas 
limit each country to no more than 7% of the total of 700,000 legal immigrant visas each 
year, although it seems obvious that countries in closer proximity, and with more reason 
6 Nakamura, “Obama Readies Executive Action on Immigration” 
7 Nakamura, “Obama Readies Executive Action on Immigration” 
8 Gonzales, Alberto, “Alberto Gonzalez: Obama’s Time for Immigration Action”, USA Today, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/08/12/border-children-action-obama-executive-authority-
action-column/13921133/, August 12, 2014 
9 Klein, Ezra, “Why the President becomes more Powerful when Congress Fails” 
10 Nakamura, “Obama Readies Executive Action on Immigration” 
7 
 
                                                          
for citizens to leave, would get a higher percentage of the total visas given11. There are so 
few avenues for low and moderately skilled workers to migrate lawfully from foreign 
countries to the United States that these migrant workers are forced to break the law to 
enter the United States and work12.  In the original theory of the United States 
government, a situation like this is supposed to immediately inspire Congress to act on 
either reforming or overhauling the immigration law, as there are clearly large 
implications economically, politically and socially. Unfortunately, the stubbornness of all 
parties involved, and the Democrats losing control of the Senate, is going to result in 
extreme difficulties in the passing of legislation on immigration, along with many other 
issues.  
President Obama and his administration have now decided to drastically act upon 
the immigration issue by using his Executive discretionary authority to step over 
Congress’ constitutional right of lawmaking and reform immigration law unilaterally13. 
The President, on November 20, 2014, made history at Del Sol High School in Las 
Vegas, Nevada, by using an Executive order to temporarily modify immigration law until 
legislation can be passed14. He set the conditions of the “Priority Enforcement Program”, 
the name he deemed the program, as follows: “If you’ve been in America for more than 
five years; if you have children who are American citizens or legal residents; if you 
11 U.S. Citzenship and Immigration Services, “Per Country Limit”, 
http://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/country-limit  
12 Johnson, Kevin and Trujillo, Bernard, “Immigration Law and the US-Mexico Border”, University of 
Arizona Press, 2011, pg 1 
13 The Washington Post Editorial Board, “Frustration over Stalled Immigration Action doesn’t mean 
Obama can act Unilaterally”, The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/frustration-
over-stalled-immigration-action-doesnt-mean-obama-can-act-unilaterally/2014/08/05/9c7bc1c6-1c1c-11e4-
ae54-0cfe1f974f8a_story.html?wpmk=MK0000200, August 5, 2014 
14 Davis, Julie, “Obama’s Immigration Action has Precedents, but May Set a New One”, The New York 
Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/us/politics/obamas-immigration-decision-has-precedents-but-
may-set-a-new-one.html?_r=1, November 20, 2014 
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register, pass a criminal background check, and you’re willing to pay your fair share of 
taxes—you’ll be able to apply to stay in this country temporarily, without fear of 
deportation”15. The program is only meant to be a temporary one until concrete 
legislation can be passed, but this seems unlikely anytime soon16. Moreover, the initiative 
can be easily reversed by a future President once in office, so reform may never follow 
from the action17. Obama’s commitment to this action may be established with the right 
ideas in mind, but the constitutionality of his action is highly debatable in the context of 
the separation of powers, and may not even be a solution to the current problems. 
Obama’s frustration due to congressional paralysis over what some people are 
considering a humanitarian crisis has become more obvious, and the Republican 
controlled House of Representatives has only passed measures that have no chance of 
becoming law regarding immigration18. Obama, because of the congressional inactivity 
on productive and beneficial immigration reform legislation, has come to believe that it is 
only natural that the Executive moves in to accomplish what the Legislature cannot19. In 
his announcement of the Priority Enforcement Program, Obama said, “Had the House of 
Representatives allowed that kind of bill a simple yes-or-no vote, it would have passed 
with support from both parties, and today it would be the law. But for a year and a half 
now, Republican leaders in the House have refused to allow that simple vote”20. He 
continues by contextualizing his prerogative power usage in the usages of past presidents, 
15 Davis, “Obama’s Immigration Action has Precedents, but May Set a New One” 
16 Davis, “Obama’s Immigration Action has Precedents, but May Set a New One” 
17 Davis, “Obama’s Immigration Action has Precedents, but May Set a New One” 
18 The Washington Post Editorial Board, “Frustration over Stalled Immigration Action doesn’t mean 
Obama can act Unilaterally” 
19 Klein, “Why the President becomes more Powerful when Congress Fails” 
20 Davis, “Obama’s Immigration Action has Precedents, but May Set a New One” 
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which further exemplifies the dangerous precedent usage of Executive action can set. He 
said, “The actions I’m taking are not only lawful, they’re the kinds of actions taken by 
every single Republican President and every single Democratic President for the past half 
century. And to those members of Congress who question my authority to make our 
immigration system work better, or question the wisdom of me acting where Congress 
has failed, I have one answer: Pass a bill”21.  
There have been a significant number of attempts at justification of Obama’s 
power to act on immigration reform, such as the maintaining of laws that are out of sync 
with social reality, the number of immigrants in the United States today being 
significantly more than the resources that authorities possess to arrest and deport them 
can handle, and the lack of realism in the policies that are becoming a threat to the rule of 
law because they force more people to break laws on a consistent basis22.  Supporters are 
attempting to justify the plan itself that Obama would institute by saying that he would 
only focus on high priority targets so no damage to the economy would be done, a 
deterrent would be created for undocumented immigrants to commit less crime so they 
are not one of the high priority targets, and the precedent that the Executive branch would 
set by suspending the enforcement of the law is more likely to favor the right-wing over 
the left in the long run23. Now, Obama has achieved the legal basis for his Executive 
prerogative usage, as the White House unusually released a formal, 33-page Justice 
21 Davis, “Obama’s Immigration Action has Precedents, but May Set a New One” 
22 Klein, Ezra, “Why the President becomes more Powerful when Congress Fails” 
23 Chait, Jonathan, “Obama’s Immigration Plan should Scare Liberals, too”, NY Mag, 
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/08/obamas-immigration-plan-should-scare-liberals.html,  
August 11, 2014 
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Department memo detailing the action’s legal justifications24. In this memo, White House 
officials and broad array of legal experts, including 10 of the nation’s top legal and 
constitutional scholars, call the new policy “lawful” and “within the powers of the 
Executive branch”25. The text of this memo specifically says, “We are law professors and 
lawyers who teach, study, and practice constitutional law and related subjects…While we 
differ among ourselves on many issues relating to Presidential power and immigration 
policy, we are all of the view that these actions are lawful. They are exercises of 
prosecutorial discretion that are consistent with governing law and with the policies that 
Congress has expressed in the statutes that it has enacted”26. Obama’s legal counsel has 
provided a precedent that could become dangerous in the future without utilizing the past 
precedent of necessity, and now Presidents will be able to cite his actions in utilizing their 
own, potentially more expansive actions. 
The President has previously expressed his belief in the rule of law, however: “If, 
in fact, I could solve all these problems without passing laws in Congress, then I would 
do so. But we’re also a nation of laws”27. Clearly, this view has changed, as his 
exercising of Executive authority, which is traditionally considered constitutional only in 
extraordinary circumstances, has now become one of the most important assertions of 
power in presidential history. Obama had previously expressed his desire to work 
together with Congress to create a solution plan, but after being rejected on multiple 
occasions, it is clear that he has given up on that approach. However, because of the lack 
24 Davis, “Obama’s Immigration Action has Precedents, but May Set a New One” 
25 Davis, Julie, “Obama’s Immigration Action has Precedents, but May Set a New One” 
26 “Scholars Letter on Immigration”, Scribd, http://www.scribd.com/doc/247489145/Scholars-Letter-on-
Immigration, November 20, 2014 
27 The Washington Post Editorial Board, “Frustration over Stalled Immigration Action doesn’t mean 
Obama can act Unilaterally” 
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of common ground that his administration and Congress have reached, many proponents 
of immigration reform in Congress were expecting the President to take action28. Illinois’ 
Democratic Representative Luis Gutierrez of the House of Representatives has been 
quoted saying, “I think the President’s going to take action on all…levels. He is going to 
take broad, expansive action that the law allows him to take”29. Gutierrez’s hopes have 
now come to fruition with Obama’s announcement of the reform of immigration law as 
an Executive order. 
Obama’s justification regarding his approach to reforming immigration law has 
caused a lot of people in government and throughout the country to debate the 
constitutionality of this action, and whether or not it destroys the separation of powers 
principles. Article I of the United States Constitution explicitly gives Congress the right 
to make laws: “All legislative Powers herein shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives”30. The wording of 
this seems to be a clear cut statement of duty, however, the argument stems over how 
Article II deems the Executive power and its scope: “the executive Power shall be vested 
in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term 
of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be 
elected, as follows”31. The dilemma continues later on in Article II, when it says, “He 
shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and 
28 Sullivan, Peter,  “As Obama Returns, Advocates look for Executive Action”, The Hill, 
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/215808-as-obama-returns-advocates-look-for-executive-action, 
August 25, 2014 
29 Sullivan, Peter,  “As Obama Returns, Advocates look for Executive Action” 
30 Article I, Section I, United States Constitution, 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html  
31 Article II, Section I, United States Constitution 
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recommend their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; 
he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case 
of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may 
adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper”32. It is clear that in the Constitution, 
when read from a textualist and traditional perspective, Congress is given the power to 
make laws, and the Executive is there to enforce these laws. On the other hand, some 
arguments stem from the fact that the Constitution was written long ago, so there is no 
way that the nation’s Founding Fathers could have known the growth path that society 
would take into this day and age.  
The legal basis from past precedence also creates an opportunity for Obama to 
find a loophole through which he is able to at least make a case for the constitutionality 
of his actions. The oath that the President takes when entering into office also convolutes 
the true answer to the question of the constitutionality of Obama using his Executive 
authority as well: it reads, “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute 
the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, 
protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States”33. When the nation is in a time 
of crisis, faithfully executing the Office of President involves coming up with sound 
solutions to the issues- on the other hand, preserving, protecting, and defending the 
Constitution means abiding by its rules, which President Obama would not be doing by 
exercising his prerogative power. In the grand scheme of the federal government, the 
roles that the three branches play are relatively simple; the Executive preserves national 
32 Article II, Section III, United States Constitution 
33 Article II, Section I, United States Constitution 
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security when necessary, while enforcing the laws; the Legislative represents the people 
while drafting and passing laws that protect the good of the whole nation; and the 
Judiciary protects individual rights. This oversimplified way of looking at a very 
complicated scenario creates an obvious answer to Obama’s situation, and the 
Constitution explicitly denies the Executive the ability to create laws unless absolutely 
necessary for the preservation of the nation, no matter how beneficial or necessary the 
laws might be on a non-existential level.    
In addition to Obama’s recent expressions of alleged respect for the rule of law in 
American governance, he condemned the Bush administration’s usage of Executive 
authority in foreign matters, and Article II of the Constitution to justify usage, to base 
part of his initial 2008 campaign for office. In an interview with The Boston Globe, 
Obama denied the presidencies constitutional right to utilize unilateral action in foreign 
policy, as well as domestically after being asked about President Bush’s example. When 
responding to a question about the constitutionality of conducting surveillance for 
national security purposes without judicial warrants, Obama says, “The Supreme Court 
has never held that the President has such powers…I will only authorize surveillance for 
national security purposes consistent with FISA and other federal statutes”34. The article 
then moves into the direction of international relations, and the Executive’s ability to act 
alone in this realm. Obama is asked whether the position of the presidency has the 
constitutional authority to bomb Iran without seeking a use-of-force authorization from 
Congress, and he responds as so: “The President does not have power under the 
34 Savage, Charlie, “Barack Obama’s Q&A”, The Boston Globe, 
http://www.boston.com/news/politics/2008/specials/CandidateQA/ObamaQA/, December 20, 2007 
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Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve 
stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation…It is always preferable to have the 
informed consent of Congress prior to any military action”35. Obama continues along the 
lines of criticizing the Bush Administration’s actions, both domestically and 
internationally, as a part of the platform for his campaign. His goal was to run as a 
complete opposite to the Bush Administration, and he expresses his misgivings about 
utilizing the Article II justification that previous presidents have given in their attempts to 
legalize the Executive prerogative power. However, a major contradiction results when 
examining this article in coagulation with Obama’s recent statements about reforming 
immigration law- If the President cannot act without Congress’ approval on the 
international front, where it is well known that he or she is prescribed more independence 
and power in action, how can he now attempt to justify the constitutionality and necessity 
of his potential actions domestically? Obama has begun to entirely contradict himself 
during his presidency from his words in this interview, first in Libya, and now in 
immigration law. 
President Obama’s pre-election convictions are based on the fact that the 
Constitution does not explicitly state the existence of the separation of powers, but both 
on an obvious and implicit level, it exists throughout the document. Most of the law of 
separation of powers has developed outside of the specific texts36, but the Constitution 
employs two main separation of powers techniques37.  First, it guarantees each branch 
35 Savage, “Barack Obama’s Q&A” 
36 Bruff, Harold, “Balance of Forces: Separation of Powers Law in the Administrative State”, Carolina 
Academic, 2006. Print, Durham, NC, 3 
37 Bruff, 27 
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particular attributes of autonomy that experience had suggested, such as Congress 
receiving control over its elections, membership, and meetings38. Second, the checks and 
balances that exist for each branch to make sure the others don’t utilize more power than 
they should, such as the existence of vetoes, and Congress’ control of the purse over the 
Executive, inherently imply the separation of powers among the major branches39. While 
the system applies to the three branches of government, in this specific case, the focus 
will primarily be on the distinctions between the Executive branch and Legislative 
branch, as that is where the dilemma lies currently. The structure of the Constitution 
appears to have been designed for three overall purposes; the Framers meant to diffuse 
and offset power in hopes of achieving a relatively even balance, or at least avoid the 
concentration of too much power in one place so as to secure the rule of law; they had 
hoped that it would protect individual liberties, although the quick establishment of the 
Bill of Rights shortly after ratification shows that this was unsuccessful; and, that the new 
government would promote the broad public interest, and not narrow faction, through 
multiple bases of political representation40. When the Constitution is read in a way that 
analyzes what the Framers meant when writing, then the appearance of separation of 
powers becomes obvious with the constitutional structure, even if it is not out rightly 
mentioned at any point. 
John Locke, who will be discussed in depth in the first chapter, is one of the 
original men to discuss the existence of prerogative power in a democratic government, 
and is often turned to when looking at issues regarding the separation of powers in the 
38 Bruff, 27 
39 Bruff, 27 
40 Bruff, 28-29 
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context of the Executive branch. His Second Treatise on Government argues strongly for 
the rule of law to be considered necessary for a solid political environment and process, 
but also includes the power of the Executive to act outside of the law when the nation is 
in crisis. According to Locke, the beginning of political society lies in its constitution by 
persons originally or naturally free, and it is the original and rightful rule of law that 
affirms individual’s natural freedom and rationality by regarding them uniformly41. The 
separation of powers follows from this uniformity and purpose of law (safety) so the 
Executive power is subordinate to the supreme Legislative power and to the supremacy 
of the rule of law42. But, under certain circumstances where the public good is at stake, 
the rule of law is not adept at providing the correct solutions so violations may be 
required43. Thus, the idea of the Executive prerogative power was born, and now 
provides United States Presidents, general academics, and anyone who has a stake in the 
issue a precedent to contextualize an argument when looking at potential usage of the 
power and its constitutionality. While Locke believes that the people will and should be 
the final judges of the actual necessity of the Executive acting, this does not apply as 
strongly nowadays, especially on such a polarizing issue during a partisan deadlock44. 
John Locke has insightful views upon the prerogative power that are very applicable to 
the current situation, and analyzing these views will help further in the analysis of 
Obama’s Executive discretionary authority regarding immigration reform. 
41 Mattie, Sean, “Prerogative and the Rule of Law in John Locke and the Lincoln Presidency”, Review of 
Politics, http://search.proquest.com/docview/60154656?accountid=10141, 2005, 82 
42 Mattie, 85 
43 Mattie, 85 
44 Kleinerman, Benjamin, “the Discretionary President: The Promise and Peril of Executive Power”, 
University Press of Kansas, 2009, print. 49 
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The second chapter will discuss the views of James Madison and Alexander 
Hamilton, which are highlighted in the Federalist Papers and The Pacificuc-Helvidius 
Debates of 1793-1794. Each of their individual viewpoints causes the other issues with 
how the Executive, and the separation of powers, should operate, and both of their 
arguments grow in terms of breadth and depth due to the opposing arguments supplied by 
each. James Madison, on one hand, understands the Constitution as a stricter doctrine of 
limited powers, creating an energetic but not over-powering national government that 
operates within limits under the idea of separation of powers45. He is of the belief that it 
is necessary for the preservation of liberty that the three departments of the federal 
government remain separate and distinct, and they are only blended when it is the goal of 
effectually guarding against an entire consolidation46. When speaking about the 
presidency, Madison has a vision of the Executive as easily limitable, but not overly so 
because the position is still in need of the means to achieve governmental ends47. 
Madison also believed that strength in the Legislature needed to be limited by increasing 
power in the Executive initially, especially in times of crisis and in the foreign realm48. 
His ultimate goal, which later came to fruition during his time as United States President, 
was to restrain each institution of the federal government to avoid a tyrannical, 
monarchical, or overreaching branch which defuses the reason that they chose to create 
the United States of America, while promoting the separation of powers and co-equal but 
45 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 119 
46 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 121 
47 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 123 
48 DePlato, Justin, “The Cavalier Presidency: Executive Power and Prerogative in Times of Crisis”, 
Lexington Books, 2014, Maryland, print. 80 
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independent branches49. Madison’s views, and role as one of the original founders of the 
country, should give President Obama a better understanding of his role as the head of the 
Executive branch and what should constitute extralegal activity by the President.  
Alexander Hamilton is also supportive in regards to the Executive’s power in the 
government and the separation of powers principles. He openly advocated for an 
“energetic and active” Executive and federal government throughout the Federalist 
Papers, as his experiences from the Articles of Confederation caused him to realize the 
necessity of a strong national government with adequate powers to achieve a national 
purpose50. Hamilton wrote in The Federalist Papers, “We forget how much ill may be 
produced by the power of hindering the doing that which is necessary to do and of 
keeping affairs in the same unfavorable posture in which they may happen to stand at 
particular periods”51. That being said, Hamilton does make the distinction that the ends 
have to justify the means of discretionary authority, and, consequently, that the ends limit 
the means, as governmental power is only unlimited insofar as it seeks the national ends 
by the Constitution in his opinion52. Hamilton is basically saying that the government 
was created to achieve its ends, so it needs the power to do this while still operating on a 
system of checks and balances. He focuses on Article II of the Constitution, and 
specifically the Executive’s command of the treaty-making power, to justify why he 
should have the right to act for the good of the nation while still being judged by the 
49 Shane, Peter, “Madison’s Nightmare: How Executive Power Threatens American Democracy”, 
University of Chicago Press, 2009, London, England, print. 2-3 
50 Pratt, Ronald, “Alexander Hamilton: The Separation of Powers”, University of Illinois Press Public 
Affairs Quarterly, 1991, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40435772, 101 
51 Hamilton, Alexander, “Federalist #22”,  The Federalist Papers, 
http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/,  137 
52 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 95 
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people and the other branches of government. Hamilton and Madison have slightly 
differing views on the Executive’s role in the federal government and the separation of 
powers idea, and have an interesting dynamic precedent that can contextualize Obama’s 
usage of prerogative power.  
Chapter 3 will discuss the Lincoln Presidency, which occurred during one of, if 
not the most trying times in history of the United States of America. Lincoln took drastic 
measures of Executive prerogative during an existential crisis for the Union, utilizing 
powers that most would never have known existed before the Civil War. As President 
during a time of immense crisis, he decided to utilize unestablished supplementary 
powers when suspending Habeas Corpus, raising an army, invading, establishing a 
military government in a captured territory, and employing tough internal security 
measures so as to preserve the nation53. The South was seceding not for issues with the 
style of governance the nation undertook and advanced, but because of specific ideals 
that they thought were necessary, which does not give them reason to leave the contract 
they agreed upon when creating the government. Lincoln, while taking these actions, 
expressed the understanding that Executive action can only be used during extraordinary 
circumstances and is extralegal; therefore, it should not be institutionalized or legalized 
as a common occurrence and should only be a supplement to the rule of law54. However, 
Lincoln’s actions themselves set a dangerous precedent, as many United States Presidents 
following him have looked at his presidency and decided that they could potentially 
53 DePlato, 99-100 
54 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 165-166 
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exercise their own Executive authority, but in situations that do not warrant it55. Because 
of the ambivalence of the people towards the presidency, there is a fear that they can be 
easily swayed by a convincing president who is able to justify his or her actions by citing 
Lincoln’s example, but not highlighting his words about the cases when prerogative 
power should be used56. Lincoln’s unique approach to the prerogative power, which 
included him not wanting to utilize it early on in his presidency because of the dangers 
that he saw with it, plays a large role in the creation of the modern president, and has led 
to unwarranted uses of Executive power as Obama’s immigration reform is today.  
One of the presidencies that clearly looked at Lincoln’s precedent, along with the 
writings of Alexander Hamilton regarding prerogative, is that of George W. Bush. The 
Bush administration’s actions post-September 11, 2001, involved heavy uses of 
Executive power, as his Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) justified his actions by citing 
words of past Presidents and those involved with structuring the Constitution. In total, his 
“dirty war” treatment and tactics involved violations of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the United 
Nations Charter, customary law prohibiting forced disappearance of human beings, and 
various customary international legal rights and proscriptions in relevant treaties57. The 
“’War’ on Terror” that Bush declared, which is a subjective and inherently ambiguous 
way to refer to battling all of terrorism around the world, was used under the umbrella of 
55 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 168 
56 Belz, Herman, “Lincoln’s Construction of the Executive Power in the Secession Crisis”, University of 
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a true Lincolnian “war”, so as to create the idea that the Union was in danger. John Yoo, 
the head of the OLC during the Bush administration, said that “our political leaders 
should consider new ways of addressing the threats posed by the new kind of enemy we 
now face”, but the administration still uses older paradigms to justify the expansion of 
presidential power58. They incorporated the thought that Congress cannot legislate for 
every contingency under the Lockean belief, as well as insisting that the expanded 
presidential power capable of overriding the laws of Congress is constitutionally 
guaranteed at all times59. By misconstruing the words of the American Founders and 
other prominent individuals on the issue of prerogative, the Bush administration justified 
clearly extralegal actions during an ordinary time because there was no necessity to 
preserve the Union from a danger, while also setting a precedent that Obama promised to 
initially avoid but is now walking a fine line of utilizing for his own political benefit. 
The impotency of the presidency in a domestic issue, such as acting on 
immigration reform, has forced Presidents in the past to become significantly more active 
on the international front. Obama has been forthcoming in this regard, but in his opinion, 
immigration law has finally reached a tipping point, and had to be restructured. Although 
the office of the President possesses a huge amount of power, the checks and balances in 
place limit him from acting on what he wants to do, what he is pledged to do, what he is 
expected to do, and what he knows he must do60. All modern Presidents have been 
frustrated by their inability to do anything about fundamental problems, and Obama’s 
58 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 2-3 
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case is no different61. Unfortunately for him and for those who support immigration 
reform, the President acting through Congress, or taking action with the consent of 
Congress, is a complicated process that requires a massive amount of support, of which 
Obama lacks62. As President of the United States, the frustrations will build, and 
attempted actions do not always work out as planned, which will be the case if the current 
President exercises his prerogative power because of the precedent that it will set and the 
difficulty that will exist in creating a solid policy that truly helps the situation and is 
enforceable.  
Defining what constitutes a crisis that requires extralegal power is a fundamental 
part of the argument regarding the usage of Executive prerogative, and it becomes 
obvious that a crisis of this magnitude does not fit the traditional Lincolnian definition of 
a crisis. The definition of a crisis large enough to allow for Executive actions through 
Article II of the Constitution, in my opinion, coincides with that of Abraham Lincoln’s 
time as President; When the state of the Union is at stake, and could potentially be 
destroyed even though democratic governance is still occurring, then supplemental 
constitutional uses of power by the Executive would be permitted, but only until the crisis 
is solved. Immigration law in the United States is not endangering the Union, and there is 
no actual threat to the nation’s future. Therefore, it does not warrant President Obama 
stepping over Congress’ constitutional rights of creating laws. The Article II argument 
that has been used in multiple presidential administrations, such as Lincoln’s and 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s, is not going over the separation of powers, primarily 
61 Hodgson, 30 
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because the argument is incorporating the prerogative power within the separation of 
powers and the Constitution. In those cases, Congress has, in the past, authorized the 
Executive to act in their place regarding these dangers, making it an easier approach, 
although they do loosen the definition of a crisis as more reference to this argument 
occurs. In spite of previous examples, President Obama has demonstrated his lack of 
comfortability in utilizing Executive authority in foreign relations, which is at an 
inherently contradictory tension with reforming immigration law because the Executive is 
supposed to have more absolute discretion and control in international relations than 
domestically.  
Obama, instead, clearly believes in his presidential policy independence on the 
home front, which perverts the functions of the separation of powers, basically stepping 
over the structure that the United States Constitution is framed around. Obama’s duty in 
this situation should be to get the Houses of Congress to convene if possible, and 
continue enforcing the laws that are in place, all-in-all following his constitutionally 
prescribed powers. While there are clearly positives that would occur in the short-term 
economically, politically, and socially, the long term implications of Obama reforming 
immigration law create a much larger issue. The separation of powers principles would 
be effectively weakened, and potentially neutralized, in the long-run because future 
Presidents will be able to cite this action as one that allows them to do even less 
deserving actions through prerogative, while also weakening congressional power. The 
blurring of the line of separation of powers, and the President’s ability to utilize 
prerogative for domestic policy advocacy and shaping public opinion, is unacceptable 
and completely independent from past examples. Further, Obama’s legalization of his 
24 
 
actions through the Department of Justice memo sets an explicit precedent for future 
Executive leaders to cite when trying to expand their branch’s power. Executive 
authority, at the maximum, is reserved for very compelling scenarios that endanger the 
safety of the government, and immigration reform does not fit this billing, as it is clearly 
a domestic policy issue constitutionally prescribed to be solved by Congress. The long-
term effects of Obama’s Executive order remains to be seen, but it is likely that this usage 
of prerogative will set a precedent that creates far too much ability in the Executive to 
expand its power beyond anything that the Founding Fathers were expecting when 
creating the Constitution under the separation of powers’ principles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
CHAPTER 2: JOHN LOCKE AND THE 
PREROGATIVE POWER 
John Locke is one of the front-runners in defining the needs, goals, and 
methodologies of running an effective and balanced democratic government through his 
writings in Two Treatises on Government. Locke, the original proponent of the rule of 
law in government, included an important discussion of prerogative power to illustrate 
his awareness of the necessity of a response to the limitations of the rule of law63. This 
discussion stems from Thomas Hobbes’ writing on the unencumbered unitary sovereign, 
as Hobbes prescribes the sovereign of the state an unlimited power, which Locke believes 
will become a much greater threat to peace than the threats prerogative power is meant to 
prevent64. In essence, Locke suggests that in a time of war, crisis, or danger to the nation, 
the normal laws set down by the Legislature might be inadequate for, or even a fatal 
obstacle to, the promptness of action to avert an existential danger to the nation65. He 
wants to be certain that the Executive emergency powers in their simplest form are those 
power the Executive gains, or uses, during a time of crisis to end the event and preserve 
the state swiftly with the appropriate amount of energy as well as be held fully 
accountable due to the singularity of the decision to respond to the crisis66. While Locke 
may be more supportive of Obama’s decision to exercise his prerogative power in 
restructuring immigration law than the other men being discussed, his commitment to the 
rule of law, his description of Legislative supremacy domestically, and the fact that he 
63 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 49 
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makes a distinction between utilizing the power out of necessity versus frustration, 
clearly shows that he would not be in support of Obama’s use and the precedent it could 
set for the usurpation of Legislative powers.  
 Locke’s discussion of Executive discretionary authority begins when he examines 
the aptitude of Legislative power, and its necessity for the successful governance of all 
democratic commonwealths. Locke says, “THE great end of man’s entering into society, 
being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety, and the great instrument and 
means of that being the laws established in that society; the first and fundamental positive 
law of all commonwealth’s is the establishing of the legislative power; as the first and 
fundamental natural law, which is to govern even the legislative itself, is the preservation 
of the society, and (as far as will consist with the public good) of every person in it”(John 
Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Section 134)67. The necessity of Legislative power 
in democratic government is a result of Locke’s idea that the rule of law must reign 
supreme, as strict law-following is the only way to eliminate subjectivity in government 
and treatment of a government’s citizens. Locke goes on to say; “…which has not its 
sanction from that legislative which the public has chosen and appointed: for without this 
the law could not have that, which is absolutely necessary to its being a law, the consent 
of the society, over whom no body can have a power to make, but by their own consent, 
and by authority received from them”(Locke, Section 134). Because the initial idea of a 
social contract, and democratic governance, is that the people agree to relinquish some of 
their freedoms for their safety, and instead will choose representatives that will make 
67 Locke, John, “Two Treaties of Government”, Hollis ed., 1689,  http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/222, 
Section 134 
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decisions for the “common good”, Locke finds that the Legislature is the ultimate 
necessary entity so as to have the rule of law above all else in ordinary circumstances. 
 Locke’s commentary of the Legislative power continues by explaining the lack of 
ability of the institution to violate the natural rights and agreements of the people. He 
says, “It is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the 
people: for it being but the joint power of every member of the society given up to that 
person, or assembly, which is legislator; it can be no more than those persons had in a 
state of nature before they entered into society… Their power, in the utmost bounds of it, 
is limited to the public good of the society… The rules that they make for other men’s 
actions, must, as well as their own and other men’s actions, be conformable to the law of 
nature” (Locke, Section 135). In this case, the “law of nature” is that of the right of man 
to life, liberty, and property, all of which the Legislative power must abide by so as to be 
considered legitimate in its rule. The law of nature, therefore, prescribes that this would 
be a violation of a constitution by which the people determined the Legislature to be the 
regular authority68. Furthermore, Locke prescribes the Legislative institution’s 
“commitment to dispensing justice, deciding the rights of the subject by promoting 
standing laws, and authorizing judges to enforce these laws” (Locke, Section 135). 
Absolute arbitrary power and governing with settled standing laws are inherently in 
tension, as they are unable to work together with the purpose of society and 
government69.  
68 Mattie, Sean, 84 
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 A major risk of Legislative domain for Locke is the possibility of the transfer of 
the power from the Legislative to any other individuals or entities in the system of 
government. Accountability to the people, as they are the ones alone who can appoint and 
constitute the Legislative, is the emphasis and purpose because it is derived from the 
people by a voluntary grant and institution, and only the Legislative has the power to 
make laws70. He establishes that Executive power, when placed anywhere but in a person 
that also has a share in the Legislative, is visibly subordinate and accountable to it and 
exists for the supreme execution of the laws, not to create laws71. This is an important 
point because it applies to the case of President Obama and immigration reform; Obama 
has become the supreme legislator in issuing his Executive decree even though in no case 
does the original prerogative power thinker express any one man’s ability to create laws 
other than the Legislative branch. Because the laws need enforcing, Locke establishes the 
idea of the Executive, and its distinction from the Legislative, which eventually leads to 
his discussion of prerogative power and its place in a Legislative-dominant style of 
governance.  
 The movement to the discussion of the prerogative power in democratic 
government then follows, manifesting from the idea that several things should be left to 
the Executive’s discretion since the common good of the society and its continuation is of 
upmost importance. Locke begins by saying, “…for the legislators not being able to 
foresee, and provide by laws, for all that may be useful to the community, the executor of 
the laws, having the power in his hands, has by the common law of nature a right to make 
70 Locke, Section 141 
71 Locke, Section 153 
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use of it for the good of society, in many cases, where the municipal law has given no 
direction…Many things there are, which the law can by no means provide for and those 
must necessarily be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power in his hands, 
to be ordered by him as the public good and advantage shall require” (Locke, Section 
159). It follows that given the impossibility of the ordinary rule of law to anticipate all 
powers that might become necessary in any given exigency, a power must exist that is not 
within the bounds of this necessary rule of law72. Locke deems prerogative as the power 
to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law and 
sometimes even against it; because some governments do not always have the lawmaking 
power and can be too slow-acting and convoluted, the Executive may need flexibility to 
do things that the laws do not prescribe him the power to do73.  
 While the existence of the prerogative power is necessary in Locke’s prescribed 
form of government, it is still most accountable to the people that are being governed. An 
issue arises, as Locke expresses doubts that the people will not scrutinize and harshly 
judge the usage of Executive discretion; the people are seldom examining its usage, so 
long as it is meant for the relative good of the people and not obviously doing them any 
damage74. In the early days of government Locke acknowledges that it is conceivable that 
it was primarily executed through paternal prerogative, as there likely was not enough 
development in the rule of law in these societies for the laws to be able to sufficiently 
govern the people; now, however, the people have found that they must declare 
limitations on prerogative for their own good as they gain more experience being 
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governed75. These restrictions lead to one of, if not, the most well-known quotes from 
Two Treatises of Government, with Locke saying, “Upon this is founded that saying, That 
the reigns of good princes have been always most dangerous to the liberties of their 
people: for when their successors, managing the government with different thoughts, 
would draw the actions of those good rulers into precedent, and make them the standard 
of their prerogative, as if what had been done only for the good of the people was a right 
in them to do…” (Locke, Section 166). The idea of prerogative precedent that can be 
potentially set applies directly the overhaul of immigration law, as Obama is utilizing 
legal justifications along with precedents set by President Lincoln during the existential 
crisis that was the Civil War, among other examples. The Bush Administration also 
looked at Lincoln’s precedent, as well as that set in The Federalist Papers by Alexander 
Hamilton, to commit and justify allegedly constitutional activities. The danger of 
precedent has long been exacerbated throughout modern history, and Obama’s usage of 
Executive discretionary authority will further the likelihood of future Executive’s going 
beyond the scope of the rule of law in ordinary situations.  
 Locke prescribes the necessity of the people to be committed to their own 
preservation and survival as no Executive action that results in the injury or damage of 
the people is justifiable. Locke says, “And this judgment cannot part with, it being out of 
a man’s power so as to submit himself to another, as to give him a liberty to destroy him; 
God and nature never allowing a man so as to abandon himself, as to neglect his own 
preservation: and since he cannot take away his own life, neither can he give another 
power to take it… But this the executive power, or wise princes, never need come in 
75 Locke, Section 162 
31 
 
                                                          
danger of: and it is the thing, of all others, they have most need to avoid, as of all others 
the most perilous” (Locke, Section 168). Natural law prescribes individual men the right 
to fight for their survival, as well as their ability to avoid injury, so once an Executive 
violates these natural rights through the usage of prerogative, or a different power, the 
rule of law must take over, along with accountability to the people. An Executive 
exercising prerogative, in Locke’s opinion, must take every action that he or she can to 
avoid injury to the people, as they are then able to appeal to heaven and the rule of law 
for the removal of said Executive. However, the deception of a strong Executive in his 
uses of discretionary authority is an issue that arises with the people’s judgment. The 
majority of people will not be moved by Executive usurpation of what are prescribed 
Legislative powers and will not be moved by the unnecessary abuse of the rights of a 
minority, even if it is a significant one, within a society76. Further, the people’s limited 
sense of government and their own well-being allows a ruler who knows how to make it 
appear to his people that he is consistently acting for the greater common good to explain 
soundly and convincingly the appearance of oppression or usurpation77. In Locke’s 
opinion, this deception would be impossible if the people felt oppressed directly, but 
when they cannot see the immediate effects upon themselves it is far easier for a ruler to 
slip by without being held accountable to what ultimately can be considered unjust 
actions78. In essence, the necessary power of the Executive combined with the people’s 
natural tendency to allow those with confidence, knowledge, and wit to reign supreme 
creates a serious threat to the security of many individuals within a society. The 
76 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 66 
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promulgation of requirement of a sound constitution, and consequently the rule of law 
arises, so as to protect the individual rights of as many as possible against the problematic 
existence of Executive discretion79. The Executive’s accountability to the people and the 
rule of law stops usurpation of powers from other necessary functions of the government, 
and therefore is necessary, even when exercising prerogative for the common good of 
society, as prerogative is institutionalized in political society by the rule of law80. 
 Locke, as a whole, expresses a deep willingness to give significantly more leeway 
to the Executive in matters of foreign affairs, depending on them being truly foreign. 
Domestically, the Executive power can and must be susceptible to direction by standing 
laws, as the Lockean paradigm is meant to limit the immense power and continued 
growth of the Executive because of the dangers that can emanate81. His first articulation 
of the distinction between foreign and domestic powers occurs when describing the 
“Federative” power (the power to direct foreign affairs): “This therefore contains the 
power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions, with all persons 
and communities without the common-wealth, and may be called federative, if anyone 
pleases” (Locke, Section 146). He continues, “And though this federative power in the 
well or ill management of it be of great moment to the common-wealth, yet it is much 
less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws, than the executive; and 
so must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those, whose hands it is in, to 
be managed for the public good…” (Locke, Section 147). This distinction between the 
Federative and the Executive power occurs because in the Executive’s case, the laws 
79 Mattie, 77 
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concern how the people relate and interact with one another within society; the 
Federative power, in an opposing fashion, exits to respond to the actions of foreigners, 
which can vary greatly and are difficult to anticipate by standing laws, so trust must be 
given to this power to do whatever is best for the society, government, and people. 
Distinguishing these powers establishes different uses of the rule of law to govern the 
Executive. 
The separation of powers that Locke advocates for (specifically the distinction 
between the Legislative power and Executive power) exists to force the Executive to 
provide reasons for his actions to the other independent branches so as to improve all of 
their functions, while also creating limits on the other branches so neither has the final 
authoritative distinction82. Locke, in his lifetime, saw the results of when a Legislative 
body is not constrained by an Executive during the “Long Parliament” and the reign of 
Cromwell, and what can happen when the King is not constrained by Parliament, when 
Charles II continuously cancelled Parliamentary meetings through much of the 1680’s83. 
These examples have caused him to understand the importance of a system of separation 
of powers and checks and balances between branches84. In addition, the people being 
governed must also be given justification for the Executive’s actions in Locke’s system, 
so as to prove to them that these actions were taken for the benefit of the common good, 
as opposed to hurting those being governed. That being said, because Executive 
prerogative allows the government to act in certain exigencies outside the authority 
provided by the existing laws, it is a crucial supplement to the constitutional order created 
82 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 6 
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by these standing laws85. Part of the promise of Executive power is that it allows the 
Legislature to leave certain kinds of actions either outside the scope of ordinary 
governmental legal authority, and for the Constitution to remain, but the entity as a whole 
to be able to handle unforeseen circumstances. Locke’s major assumption of an essential 
relationship between liberalism— the government’s aims to secure the people’s lives, 
liberties, and properties— and constitutionalism— the government acts according to 
established, standing laws that apply to everybody equally— is a necessity to continue 
the viability of the regime86. 
The Two Treatises of Government establishes goals for the overall good 
governance of a regime in order to provide a compelling reason for each branch and 
entity to be able to limit each other and effectively rule over its constituents. First, Locke 
wants to use the principles of natural law to override the controversy between the 
Legislative branch and the Executive branch by showing that it is unacceptable for either 
to act contrary to the proper ends of government and acceptable for either to act to 
achieve those ends with the rest of the government’s approval of the actions taken and the 
powers exercised87. The long lasting protection of liberty is a priority, and the superiority 
of the rule of law is a more dependable method to achieve this; together, they give us a 
predictable landscape of government, as opposed to allowing for an unpredictable ruler to 
take control in all instances88. Executive power is a constitutional authority distinct from 
and superior to normal legislation, but also confines prerogative within fundamental 
85 Corbett, Ross, “The Extraconstitutionality of Lockean Prerogative”, Cambridge University Press, 2006,  
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“legal” limits, such as the rule of law, accountability, the people, so as to be able to 
identify usurpations and tyranny89. When the Executive claims his prudence to administer 
his power within the laws, and in terms of his space for discretion, as he sees fit, it does 
not prove that he is superior or independent to the Legislature; if the Executive 
successfully argues that he cannot be legitimately curtailed or questioned, the regime has 
become imbalanced, as the rule of law becomes a meaningless defense against 
arbitrariness90. Prerogative, as it appears to Locke, must be understood to be a natural 
power and beyond constitutional control—as it stands outside of the government’s 
constitution because its logic denies that a good constitution is sufficient for liberal 
constitutional governance91.  
Constitutionalism is intrinsically tied to the Legislature rather than to the 
Executive, so if an original constitution can make it clear to the people that laws are only 
properly made by the Legislative branch, and it is understood as separate from the 
Executive branch, then legislators have the ability to demonstrate to the people that their 
constitutional powers are being breached when Executives seek to do too many things 
outside of their prescribed powers92. Overall, the necessity of democratic governance to 
rely on a set of written laws in the form of a constitution allows for both Executive and 
Legislative accountability in their actions, but Locke still contests that the prerogative 
power can be necessary outside of the rule of law, as long as the people approve of the 
actions and they are for the common good of the society. 
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The United States government, and the Constitution, is modeled consistently with 
Locke’s prescription of ideal democratic governmental form for persistence of the 
society, as well as existence of prerogative but not in its constitutionality. First, in regards 
to foreign affairs, the Executive has a significantly larger amount of unchecked power 
than domestically as there is no societal governing document that he must abide by. 
However, currently, Barack Obama has expressed opposing beliefs to this, which is very 
rare for an American president. He believes that the Executive is more accountable to 
Congress on foreign affairs, citing the Bush Administration, and that he has the ability to 
be independent of Congress domestically and reform immigration law. This belief 
inherently goes against Locke’s writings, primarily due to the premise that he is violating 
the rule of law, and the constitutionally prescribed powers that the Legislature has, to 
resolve a non-existential issue that only some consider a crisis of magnitude. Inability to 
fulfill duties, as Locke has said, is not a reason for the Executive to be able to exercise 
prerogative discretion, as the lawmaking power is entirely given to the Legislature by the 
United States’ fundamental Constitution. Locke realizes that the extraordinary is an 
ordinary part of politics93, with the definition of extraordinary being an incident placing 
the nation at risk that the Constitution, and the laws that have been made subsequently, 
are unable to prescribe a solution to, which is why prerogative exists. However, the 
Obama Immigration Order is not one that meets the standard of the definition of 
extraordinary circumstances. The legislators in Congress are openly pointing to the 
Constitution, and Obama’s violation of it, as Locke exactly said should be able to happen 
because of the supreme rule of law and supreme document. Immigration law is explicitly 
93 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 49 
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under Congress’ jurisdiction, and therefore, the Executive has no right, in Locke’s view, 
to step over the Legislature’s explicit powers and create a solution unilaterally to a 
domestic legal issue.  
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CHAPTER 3: ALEXANDER HAMILTON’S 
ENERGETIC EXECUTIVE AND JAMES MADISON’S 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
The Federalist Papers were written primarily by Alexander Hamilton and James 
Madison, two of the most prominent Founding Fathers in terms of their contributions to 
the United States’ constitutional structure. The papers were published during 1787 and 
1788 in multiple New York State newspapers to persuade voters in New York to ratify 
the proposed constitution, which they ultimately succeeded in doing94. These documents 
outlined the functions of the United States government that would come to exist with the 
Constitution, established the system of separation of powers and checks and balances 
within the structure, and created an infamous dialogue between Hamilton and Madison 
regarding their fear of power in the Legislative and the treaty-making power later on in 
the The Pacificus-Helvidius debates. All of the essays in The Federalist Papers are 
signed “Publius”, but it is widely thought that Hamilton wrote fifty-two of the essays, 
Madison wrote twenty-eight, and John Jay, whom will not be discussed, wrote the 
remaining five95. When Madison formulated the idea of writing The Federalist Papers, 
Alexander Hamilton was his fourth choice as a collaborator; a New York luminary 
rejected him, another proved inadequate to the task, and his third, John Jay, fell ill after 
only completing a short few; Hamilton ended up being his prime choice96. 
94 FoundingFathersinfo, “The Federalist Papers”, http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/  
95 FoundingFathersinfo, “The Federalist Papers”  
96 Shane, 1 
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 Madison’s idea behind creating and distributing these documents, besides 
advocating for ratification of the proposed constitution, was to promulgate the reasons for 
why a constitution, specifically one with the proposed constitution’s structure, is 
necessary for good governance. In Federalist 20, Madison says, “Tyranny has perhaps 
oftener grown out of the assumptions of power, called for, on pressing exigencies, by a 
defective constitution, than out of the full exercise of the largest constitutional 
authorities”(Madison, Federalist #2097). Both of their commitments to a constitutional 
structure of this capacity is clearly visible throughout their writings, as they advocate for 
specific powers and abilities of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches of 
government to achieve the ends of constitutional government without encroaching on the 
other branches. Their writings have resulted in a precedent of fundamental separation of 
powers and a checks and balances system that clearly explains the thought-process 
behind the creation of the Constitution. Since the document was published, it has been 
examined and cited by many, including United States Presidents, when discussing a 
multitude of different issues and the solutions being undertaken to eliminate them.  
When looking at President Obama’s Executive order regarding immigration 
reform, both Hamilton and Madison’s commitment to the rule of law, and the separation 
of powers system, would cause them to disapprove of his power-usurping actions without 
proving necessity. While they both promote the idea of an energetic Executive, this is 
primarily because of their desire to limit the Legislative power and prevent Legislative 
tyranny, not to give free reign to the Executive over the other branches whenever he so 
97 Madison, James, “Federalist #20”, http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fed20.htm, The 
Federalist Papers, December 1787 
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chooses. The separation of powers were designed with the idea of limiting each branch of 
government to execute its own constitutionally prescribed powers without major 
interference or overstepping by any of the other branches. Clearly, Obama’s Executive 
decree is a direct usurpation of explicit congressional powers and the Legislature’s role in 
the national government. Hamilton, although he advocates heavily for an energetic 
Executive throughout The Federalist Papers and The Pacificus-Helvidius debates, and 
even supports Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality in France, would still be hesitant 
in giving his approval for such an explicit disregard for the separation of powers 
principles and direct over-stepping of the Legislative branch. In The Pacificus-Helvidius 
debate regarding the treaty-making power, Madison’s true regard for the inability of the 
President to act without congressional cooperation on the foreign front clearly 
demonstrates that his response to domestic constitutional usurpation of explicit powers 
would not be one of support, although he mildly contradicts his original line of thought 
articulated in The Federalist Papers. Further, the clear polarization of thought in the 
American public regarding the immigration law issue would cause both to be even more 
questioning of Obama’s announcement and decision, as the violation of separation of 
powers creates a dangerous precedent for future Presidents, and is currently an outright 
ignorance of constitutional laws.  
Alexander Hamilton- the Energetic Executive 
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison’s partner in writing The Federalist Papers, 
and one of the men commonly considered to have played a major role in constructing the 
format of the Constitution, is very supportive of an energetic Executive within a system 
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of energetic governance, so as to fulfill the goals and agenda of government as a whole. 
Under the same mindset as John Locke, Hamilton advocates for the Constitution to be 
understood as empowering government to take all necessary actions without limitations, 
as unforeseen scenarios and occurrences will arise at some point in the country’s future 
that the rule of law is not capable of preparing a solution for immediately. He says, “THE 
necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the 
preservation of the Union, is the point at the examination of which we are now arrived. 
This inquiry will naturally divide into three branches the objects to be provided by the 
federal government, the quantity of power necessary to the accomplishment of these 
objects, the persons upon whom that power ought to operate” (Hamilton, Federalist #23). 
Hamilton continues to highlight the importance of the safety of the people, as well as 
multiple other goals of government that need to be achieved for good governance to be 
declared. He says, “The principal purposes to be answered by union are these the 
common defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace as well against 
internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce with other nations 
between the States; the superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, 
with foreign countries” (Hamilton, Federalist #23). Hamilton’s experiences with the 
Congress created by the Articles of Confederation affirmed his belief that the United 
States needed to establish a national government and ensure its possession of adequate 
powers to achieve a national purpose, as the inherent weakness of Congress to carry out 
legislation requires a need for a strong national institution and Executive98. Hamilton’s 
commitment to the idea of strength in government eventually leads to him opposing 
98 Pratt, 101 
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Madison on the treaty-making power discussed in the Pacificus-Helvidius debates, even 
though they seem to be in agreement regarding the separation of powers and the 
Executive in The Federalist Papers. 
Hamilton’s belief in the necessity of an energetic national government begins 
with his support for an energetic Executive, as he sees this position as the head of the 
government with the best ability to act for the good of its people. His argument is as 
follows; the Executive must have the energy capabilities required to respond to a crisis; 
he must be able to use the army as he sees fit to respond to the crisis; there will be cases 
where the Executive will need to act swiftly and even secretly without initial 
congressional approval; his role is to preserve the state; and to ensure accountability for 
the actions taken while responding to a crisis99. In Federalist #70, Hamilton says, 
“Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the good definition of government. It is 
essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential 
to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those 
irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of 
justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of 
faction, and of anarchy” (Hamilton, Federalist #70). In other words, an Executive with a 
strong right to act is what will stop the issues that Madison foresees occurring with the 
separation of powers from coming to fruition. Hamilton then lays out the four necessary 
ingredients for energy in the Executive—unity, duration, provision for support, and 
99 DePlato, 40-41 
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competent powers100.  These ingredients all give the government a strong means to 
achieve its functional ends efficiently and effectively. 
Hamilton goes on to speak about the authorities essential to the common defense, 
and why they must be given to the national government. Hamilton says, “The authorities 
essential to the common defense are these: To raise armies; to build and equip fleets; to 
prescribe rules for the government of both; to direct their operations; to provide for their 
support. These powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to 
foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent 
extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The 
circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no 
constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is 
committed” (Hamilton, Federalist #23). In his vision of the United States, these powers 
all should be under the Executive because of its inherent ability to act unhindered without 
deliberation and with swiftness in situations that require efficient responses to be 
successfully combated. The presidency’s powers are derived from the advantage of its 
unique institutional position and its distinct structural functions, but for him, the ends of 
the powers used must be able to justify the means, which also means that the ends limit 
the means101. Hamilton says, “It rests upon axioms as simple as they are universal; the 
MEANS ought to be proportioned to the END; the persons, from whose agency the 
attainment of any END is expected, ought to possess the MEANS by which it is to be 
attained” (Hamilton, Federalist #23). This argument is Hamilton’s version of limiting the 
100 Hamilton, “Federalist #70” 
101 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 94 
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Executive power of prerogative, as he advocates for a required justification of actions, 
but if given and accepted, then the actions are constitutionally permissible to undertake. 
Because the Executive can be easily monitored in its actions, prescribing it the means to 
energetically act is much less dangerous than to potentially risk allowing Legislative un-
checkable power with no accountability.  
Hamilton’s ultimate fear is a government inadequately equipped with powers to 
deal with circumstances outside of the rule of law, and he believes that a weak Executive 
will limit the ability of a government to make decisions swiftly and decisively. Strength 
in the Executive is important, as he says, “A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution 
of government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a 
government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad 
government” (Hamilton, Federalist #70). In his mind, because the government may not 
be able to foresee circumstances in which certain powers may be necessary, the fear of 
encroachment upon the freedom of power is unfounded, and the Executive should be 
given whatever he needs to preserve the Union and execute his duties faithfully102. By 
refraining from detailing the Executive’s powers, Hamilton claims the other Framers 
provided the presidency with the ability to respond to the protean nature of attacks and 
their frequency, thus enabling the Executive to respond without encroaching upon power 
but still completing his duties to the nation103. In regards to the checks on the President, 
and in particular impeachment, Hamilton shows that the robust power of impeachment 
might actually promote a strong Executive because it gives a feeling of comfortability to 
102 Pratt, 102 
103 DePlato, 44 
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the people being governed over simply because of the fact that they know there is a check 
on Executive prerogative104. The fear of weak governance, in Hamilton’s mind, is more 
profound then the fear of an Executive usurping power because of the fact that foresight 
into what instances the nation may face in the future is not possible.  
While an Executive unbound by rules when necessary should exist in Hamilton’s 
mind, accountability still plays a role in his vision of the prerogative power. He outlines 
two fundamental necessities constituting safety, saying: “The ingredients which 
constitute safety in the republican sense are, first, a due dependence on the people, 
secondly, a due responsibility” (Hamilton, Federalist #70). Hamilton assumes that the 
branches will easily exchange information amongst each other so as to be totally 
transparent and accountable, which may be idealistic, as an important part of the struggle 
between Congress and the Executive in recent history is the congressional efforts to 
obtain information from the Executive, which are often resisted to protect Executive 
autonomy105. He continues by outlining the kinds of responsibility that the people being 
governed have when analyzing Executive actions. He says, “Responsibility is of two 
kinds to censure and to punishment. The first is the more important of the two, especially 
in an elective office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to 
render him unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him 
obnoxious to legal punishment” (Hamilton, Federalist #70). Removing someone from 
office, or just not re-electing them, displays a disapproval for their actions while in office, 
104 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 112 
105 Bruff, 356 
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and the fact that they do not successfully fulfill their roles in the duty as well as they 
could. 
The danger of usurpation of power exists through the people in addition to the 
government, because as Locke and Madison have previously outlined, the people are very 
rarely as politically active and viable to hold every political official, and especially the 
Executive, to the standards of accountability initially outlined and desired of the general 
population. Usurpation cannot be controlled through constitutional shackles in 
Hamilton’s opinion; instead, it must be controlled through a constitutional structure that 
holds those accountable who do usurp power, and the people are not responsive to this 
encroachment106. Hamilton says, “If the representatives of the people betray their 
constituents, there is then no resource left but in that original right of self-defense which 
is paramount to positive forms of government” (Hamilton, Federalist #28). He means that 
the people should be at least partially responsible in holding the Executive at fault for 
whatever actions taken if it is not for the true common good of the society, and Hamilton 
finds it to be one of the primary constraints on Executive prerogative. Accountability 
results from the people’s ability to allow or condemn an Executive’s usage of discretion, 
the inherent desires of man’s nature to keep equal power in the other branches of 
government, and following from that, the Executive’s absolute responsibility to the 
people and to the society as a whole to act within good faith and for the common benefit 
of those being governed. President Obama’s direct usurpation of Congress’ 
constitutionally prescribed powers is exactly what both Madison and Hamilton are 
attempting to discourage when creating The Federalist Papers and the Constitution. 
106 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 96 
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The Pacificus-Helvidius Debates of 1793-1794 truly encompass how Hamilton 
and Madison believe the Executive powers are to be applied, as Hamilton sticks to his 
ideals of a strong and energetic Executive while Madison regresses in his argument and 
advocates for a more limited Executive in the domain of the treaty-making and war-
making powers. These debates were ignited by George Washington’s Proclamation of 
Neutrality of 1793 regarding the United States’ agreement with the French and whether 
President Washington had the authority to declare America neutral despite an early 
alliance treaty107. Hamilton begins his argument for the Executive treaty-making power 
by outlining the objections against Washington’s Proclamation: that the Proclamation 
was without authority, was contrary to the United States’ treaties with France, was 
contrary to the gratitude, which is due from this to that country because France assisted 
the United States in seceding from England, and that it was out of time and 
unnecessary108. However, it is the initial complaint that is most important regarding this 
debate, as it is where he focuses on the Executive’s constitutional role in the treaty-
making power. Hamilton says, “The Legislative Department is not the organ of 
intercourse between the United States and foreign nations. It is charged neither with 
making nor interpreting Treaties. It is therefore not naturally that organ of the 
government which is to pronounce the existing condition of the Nation, with regards to 
foreign powers, or to admonish the Citizens of their obligations and duties as founded 
upon that condition of things. Still less it is charged with enforcing the execution and 
observance of these obligations and those duties” (Hamilton, Pacificus #1, 11). Because 
107Hamilton, Alexander and Madison, James, “The Pacificus-Helvidius Debates of 1793-1794”: Toward the 
Completion of the American Founding, edited with and Introduction by Morton J. Frisch (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 2007). http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1910/3953_LFeBk.pdf , 9 
108 Hamilton, “The Pacificus-Helvidius Debates of 1793-1794”, 9 
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the Executive is given a significant amount of leeway in terms of his foreign actions, 
Hamilton subsequently articulates that the Executive has control of the treaty-making 
power. He also focuses on why it is not an inherently Judicial power, writing, “It is 
equally obvious that the act in question is foreign to the Judiciary Department of the 
Government. The province of that Department is to decide litigations in particular cases. 
It is indeed charged with the interpretation of treaties; but it exercises this function only 
in the litigated cases; that is where contending parties bring before it a special 
controversy” (Hamilton, Pacificus, 11). According to Hamilton, the Judiciary could 
preside over the issue in question, but definitely does not have the treaty-making power 
within its constitutionally granted powers.  
Hamilton continues by establishing connections between the treaty-making power 
and the Executive powers already expressed and established. He says, “It appears to be 
connected with that department (Executive) in various capacities, as the organ of 
intercourse between the Nation and foreign Nations—as the interpreter of the National 
Treaties in those cases in which the Judiciary is not competent, that is in the cases 
between government and government—as that power, which is charged with the 
Execution of the Laws, of which treaties form a part—as that Power is charged with the 
command and application of Public Force” (Hamilton, Pacificus #1, 11). He then 
supports his point by citing the Constitution’s text: “In the article which grants the 
legislative powers of the government the expressions are—‘All Legislative powers herein 
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States’; in that which grants the 
Executive power the expressions are, as already quoted ‘The Executive Power shall be 
vested in a President of the United States of America’” (Hamilton, Pacificus #1, 12). The 
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Executive power of the nation is vested in the President, with only a few exceptions of 
absolute power, such as the participation of the Senate in the making of treaties, but not 
giving Congress the entire power109. Following from this, Hamilton says that the issuing 
of a Proclamation of Neutrality is merely an Executive act in nature110. 
Although the Senate plays a role in the making of treaties, Hamilton explicitly 
states that their role in the foreign realm should be limited strictly to that, and not involve 
more domain than is explicitly prescribed. He writes, “It deserves to be remarked, that as 
the participation of the Senate in the making of Treaties and the power of the Legislature 
to declare war are exceptions out of the general ‘Executive Power’ vested in the 
President, they are to be construed strictly—and ought to be extended no further than is 
essential to their execution” (Hamilton, Pacificus #1, 16). During times of peace, the 
Executive is in charge of the nation—the Legislature has the power to remove the nation 
from a time of peace by declaring war, but doesn’t operate in the foreign realm other than 
in that capacity111. He concludes by saying, “The President is the constitutional Executor 
of the laws, Our Treaties and the laws of nations form a part of the law of the land. He 
who is to execute the laws must first judge for himself of their meaning” (Hamilton, 
Pacificus #1, 16). Overall, this debate regarding the power exercised by Washington 
continues along Hamilton’s ideas of a strong national government with a powerful 
Executive. 
109 Hamilton, Pacificus #1, 13 
110 Hamilton, Pacificus #1, 13 
111 Hamilton, Pacificus #1, 16 
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In conclusion, Hamilton remains of the beliefs that he articulated in The 
Federalist Papers throughout his argument regarding the Proclamation of Neutrality 
unlike James Madison regarding the energetic role of the Executive for the sake of good 
governance. 
James Madison- the Separation of Powers and Rule of Law 
 James Madison is often viewed as the lead designer of the United States 
Constitution, and his structure and goals from the document are very forthcoming 
through The Federalist Papers so as to appeal to the people and states even though the 
separation of powers are not explicitly stated in the text of the Constitution. He focuses 
on advocating for three independent branches with checks and balances on each other so 
as to stop one from gaining an unnecessary power over the other, which is intended 
primarily to prevent Legislative tyranny. Madison, in Federalist #51, says, “The great 
security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department 
consists in giving to those who administer each department in the necessary constitutional 
means and personal motives to resist encroachment of others” (Madison, Federalist 51). 
Madison is of the belief that the Executive should initially have his powers inflated 
artificially, but once the system is placed in motion, the separation of powers comes to 
fruition among the three branches. He claims that it is necessary for the preservation of 
liberty that the three departments remain separate and distinct, saying, “In order to lay a 
due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of 
government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the 
preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; 
51 
 
and consequently should be constituted that the members of each should have as little 
agency as possible in the appointment of the members of others” (Madison, Federalist 
51). Madison later continues, so as to establish balance between acceptable constitutional 
functions and those considered unacceptable, that even though power can be possessed 
inherently through the Constitution, it does not mean that is translates into the inherent 
goodness of the ends pursued with these means112. However, he creates a contradiction in 
his original support for an energetic Executive in The Pacificus-Helvidius debates as he 
attempts to advocate for the limiting of the President’s powers in the international 
domain. 
 Accountability of the federal government is of the upmost importance to 
preventing illegal usurpations of a branches powers, so in Madison’s mind, through the 
multiplicity of the institutions, each with different constituencies, organizational 
structures, modes of selection, and internal decision making processes, the United States 
would not begin a program of public policy or action without the examination of that 
policy from various different perspectives and those with different agendas113. He says, 
“It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the 
oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the 
other part… If a majority be united by common interest, the rights of the minority will be 
insecure, There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a 
will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself…” 
(Madison, Federalist #51). The ability of his belief to become a reality, and persist as one, 
112 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 121, 123 
113 Shane, 7 
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depends on the capacity of the government to demonstrate informal practices of 
cooperation and mutual respect among the branches of government114. At the same time, 
he continues to maintain that the United States Constitution’s major achievement is that it 
properly separates the respective branches, while forcing each branch to abide by its 
traditional role so as to keep a balance of power and eliminate the threat of usurpation; 
the Executive executes the laws, the Legislative makes the laws, and the Judiciary 
maintains and interprets the laws115. The articulation of the separation of powers, and 
their implicit existence in the Constitution, were Madison’s security blanket, in the end, 
to an overly strong Legislative. Because he is the original believer in the Legislature 
explicitly making the laws in the federal government, President Obama’s Executive order 
would clearly be understood as an unconstitutional usurpation of a clear Legislative 
power. 
 Madison’s constitutional system of separation of powers depends on the absence 
of the ability to exercise unlimited prerogative by any branch so that actors are unable to 
claim unquestionable inherent powers. His view of the government being accountable to 
the people follows because the Constitution is a foundational document by which the 
people establish their sovereignty over the government, and therefore, cause the different 
branches to be accountable to their document. He says, “The several departments being 
perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their common commission, none of them, it is 
evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between 
their respective powers; and how are the encroachments of the stronger to be prevented, 
114 Shane, 175 
115 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 123 
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or the wrongs of the weaker to be redressed, without an appeal to the people themselves, 
who, as the grantors of the commissions, can alone declare its true meaning and enforce 
its observance” (Madison, Federalist #49). As Locke stated previously, and as many of 
the original thinkers on democratic governance believe, the people are those that the 
government is accountable to in the end; however, Madison finds that the people only 
play a portion of the role of judging accountability, as he later goes on to discuss inherent 
issues that may occur. He writes, “In the first place, the provision does not reach the case 
of a combination of two of the departments against the third. If the legislative authority, 
which possesses so many means of operating on the motives of other departments, should 
be able to gain to its interest either of the others, or even one third of its members, the 
remaining department could derive no advantage from its remedial provision” (Madison, 
Federalist #49). Although this fault exists, Madison is of the belief that the people need to 
conceptualize every unjustified public usurpation of power ass an encroachment on the 
private right of every single person being governed over, and that the public should 
respect and entrench the Constitution enough so as to circumscribe the political actions 
by the force of public opinion116. Because the people would be unable to hold two 
branches accountable in this situation, and because the third branch’s checks on the other 
two branches would be effectively eliminated, the separation of powers must persist in a 
strong enough methodology so as to eliminate the potential for this danger. 
Madison spends a portion of The Federalist Papers focused on why the 
Legislative should not be given a lot of discretion to exercise power in particular, and 
116 Madison, James, “Federalist #49, #50”, The Federalist Papers, 
http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fed49.htm, 
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how the individual should be checked by the other branches. He does so to avoid an over-
concentration of power in the place where it can most easily be abused, as has occurred 
within the states’ governments, and where accountability is at its lowest because there are 
many members of the Legislative body. Madison, to create a solution to the danger of 
having the parchment barriers system that some of the states implemented through their 
constitutions that favor and basically require governance to occur through the Legislative 
branch, initially desired for an Executive that could act with energy and swiftness so as to 
mitigate that risk117. When speaking about the ease with which the Executive and 
Judiciary can be restrained compared to the Legislative, Madison writes, “On the other 
side, the Executive power being restrained within a narrower compass, and being more 
simple in its nature, and the judiciary being described by landmarks still less uncertain, 
projects of usurpation by either of these departments would immediately betray and 
defeat themselves” (Madison, Federalist #48). The accountability that the Executive 
encompasses allows for it to be more powerful initially than the Legislative, and the 
Judiciary branch only makes judgments on the laws, which limits its power inherently.  
Madison’s encouragement and support of the Executive branch having supremacy 
over the other two branches also initially emanates from the fact that the Legislature has 
strong checks on the President. First, the presence of the impeachment power is 
emphasized by Madison, as he consistently suggests that it must play a prominent role in 
limiting the Executive. He says, citing the New Hampshire State Constitution, “The 
Senate, which is a branch of the legislative department, is also a judicial tribunal for the 
117 Madison, James, “Federalist #49, #50”, The Federalist Papers, 
http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fed49.htm, 
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trial of impeachments” (Madison, Federalist #47). His idea of what constitutes grounds 
for impeachment is different than some of the other Founding Fathers’ opinions, as he 
objected to including maladministration as an impeachable offense during the 
Constitutional Convention because of the fear that it would give Congress too much 
power over the Executive, saying, “So vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during 
pleasure of the Senate”118. That being said, impeachment is one of Congress’ ultimate 
weapons against Executive personnel in Madison’s opinion, as it is an exception to the 
Constitution’s guarantees of autonomy for each of the three branches119. Another check 
upon the Executive, the congressional check of the purse, where Congress has the ability 
to control the appropriations given to the President to carry out the laws, provides a 
limitation on the Executive regarding how much production he can have in office120. The 
President is only capable of executing the laws faithfully and creating change in society 
during his time in office with money, thus the monetary check creates an extremely 
viable and demanding position for Congress, forcing the President to have more 
allegiance to their will.  
In addition, Congress also possesses the ability to override vetoes that the 
President exercises upon legislation by a 2/3 vote in both houses—not an unreachable 
margin by any means, but definitely still difficult enough to limit the power of Congress 
to completely remove the Executive from the process121. The veto power, which initially 
places the Executive in a position of control regarding the Legislative law-making 
118 University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, “The Constitution and Impeachment”, 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/impeach/constitution.html, 11/29/14 
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process, exists to reconcile the separation of powers as a limited check that can only, if 
the margin is achieved, override the President and empower the Legislative branch. What 
Madison fears is that the veto power does not have an even balance on both sides, as the 
Legislative is easily able to overcome the check, but it does give enough power to the 
Executive in the case that Congress is divided on a certain piece of legislation to take 
some sort of action, or it is just an irresponsible law. Last, the Senate has the ability to 
deny both Supreme Court appointments and ratification of treaties with other 
countries122. These powers allow for the Legislature to have control of the ability of the 
President to determine the composition of the highest Court by choosing only those who 
will side with him in interpretation of constitutional laws, and stop him from completely 
utilizing his Federative power to run the country internationally as he pleases123. These 
checks mitigate the strength of the Executive on multiple levels, and inherently increase 
accountability of the government. Overall, the Executive is accountable in his actions 
through the checks that the Legislative branch has, as he can be limited in multiple 
discreet methods within the context of Madison’s strong separation of powers and checks 
and balances system.  
On the other hand, the Executive possesses fewer checks on Congress so as to 
mitigate Legislative strength. First, as was already highlighted, is the veto power that the 
President has regarding laws that Congress decides to pass124. The veto power gives the 
Executive a dimension in the Legislative law-making power, but the Legislature can 
respond by limiting funds or increasing the usage of other checks in the system. Second, 
122 Shane, 28-29 
123 Shane, 28-29 
124 Shane, 29 
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the Vice President, a member of the Executive cabinet, is the real President of the Senate, 
presiding over meetings and issue discussion throughout125. This gives the President 
direct involvement in hearing what is going on with the Senate, but doesn’t give him any 
say or tangible involvement in legislation in discussion, as the Vice President doesn’t 
play a large role in Congress even in this position. The Executive can also make recess 
appointments in the Supreme Court, as well as call into session one or both houses of 
Congress in emergencies126. However, neither of these powers is substantive, as recess 
appointments can be reversed as soon as Congress is back in session, and the ability to 
call Congress into session doesn’t give the Executive any more power than he already has 
regarding the substance of what is occurring during the sessions. The Executive checks 
on the Legislative are much less powerful than those that the Legislative possesses, which 
is a primary reason why Madison is an advocate for a strong Executive and prevalent 
separation of powers among the branches.  
While Madison is clearly in support of a weakened Legislative power via an 
energetic Executive to avoid usurpation, he later goes on to contradict himself by de-
energizing the Executive in his discussion regarding the treaty-making and treaty-ending 
powers in The Pacificus-Helvidius debate, where he vehemently argues against Hamilton 
initial words in saying that it is inherently a Legislative power because it is law. To give 
an idea of the distaste Madison has for Hamilton’s words in the Pacificus writings, he 
says, “Several pieces with the signature of Pacificus were lately published, which have 
been read with singular pleasure and applause, by the foreigners and degenerate citizens 
125 US Constitution, http://www.usconstitution.net/consttop_cnb.html  
126 US Constitution, http://www.usconstitution.net/consttop_cnb.html 
58 
 
                                                          
among us, who hate our republican government, and the French Revolution; whilst the 
publication seems to have been too little regarded, or too much despised by the steady 
friends to both” (Madison, Helvidius #1, 55127). His frustrations become prevalent 
throughout Helvidius, as he often quotes Hamilton in his argument for the Executive 
treaty-making/ending power, while attacking the core basis of the argument made. 
Madison’s argument rests upon the fact that the power to make treaties is a law-
making power, not a power that involves the execution of the laws which the Constitution 
clearly cites is the primary, and basically sole, purpose of the Executive. First, when 
highlighting the Constitution, he writes, “This conclusion becomes irresistible, when it is 
recollected, that the constitution cannot be supposed to have placed either any power 
legislative in its nature, entirely among executive powers, or any power executive in its 
nature, entirely among legislative powers, without charging the constitution, with that 
kind of intermixture and consolidation of different powers, which would violate a 
fundamental principle in the organization of free governments” (Madison, Helvidius #1, 
60-61). Because the Constitution gives the war-declaring power expressly to Congress, 
then it follows that the treaty-making power, which is the ability to end wars or start 
them, is inherently Legislative. When speaking about the Legislative functions, he says, 
“If we consult for a moment, the nature and operation of the two powers to declare war 
and make treaties, it will be impossible not to see that they can never fall within a proper 
definition of executive powers. The Natural province of the executive magistrate is to 
execute laws, as that of the legislatures to make laws. All his acts therefore, properly 
executive, must presuppose the existence of the laws to be executed. A treaty is not an 
127 Hamilton, Alexander and Madison, James, “The Pacificus-Helvidius Debates of 1793-1794”  
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execution of laws: it does not pre-suppose the existence of laws. It is, on the contrary, to 
have itself the force of a law, and to be carried into execution like all other laws, by the 
executive magistrate. To say then that the power of making treaties which are confessedly 
laws, belongs naturally to the department which is to execute laws, is to say, that the 
executive department naturally includes a legislative power. In theory, this is an 
absurdity—in practice a tyranny” (Madison, Helvidius #1, 59). This argument is 
compelling because of the fact that treaties, when instituted, are considered law until 
repealed—however, because the Legislative is not in full control of the treaty-making 
power, in that the Executive can draft the treaties, the argument falters slightly using 
Madison’s argument, as treaty-making and repealing should be fully under Legislative 
domain if his claims of congressional powers in this case are to be considered true. 
Madison continues along the idea that the treaty-making power is inherently a 
law-making initiative through ironic inclinations and a strong dislike for the argument 
that Hamilton makes. He writes, “Treaties when formed according to the constitutional 
mode, are confessedly to have the force and operation of laws, and are to be a rule for the 
courts in controversies between man and man, as much as any other laws” (Madison, 
Helvidius #2, 61). He continues sarcastically, “Were it once established that powers of 
war and treaty are in their nature executive; that so far they’re not by strict construction 
transferred to the legislature, they actually belong to the executive; that of course all 
powers not less executive in their nature than those powers, if not granted to the 
legislature may be claimed by the executive. If granted, are to be taken strictly, with a 
residuary right in the executive; or, as will hereafter appear, perhaps claimed as a 
concurrent right by the executive; and no citizen could any longer guess at the character 
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of the government under which he lives; the most penetrating jurist would be unable to 
scan the extent of constructive prerogative” (Madison, Helvidius #2, 65). Madison’s fear 
of the Constitution being interpreted any way that the interpreter sees fit comes to fruition 
here, as he clearly begins to fear the potential for the Executive to construe the original 
text to give him more power.  
Madison concludes his remarks regarding the Executive’s ability to control the 
treaty-making and treaty-ending powers by highlighting the importance of the separation 
of powers principles that the Constitution is based around. He says, “an independent 
exercise of an executive act, by the legislature alone, or of a legislative act by the 
executive alone, one or other of which must happen in every case where the same act is 
exerciseable by each, and the latter of which would happen in the case urged by the 
writer, is contrary to one of the first and best maxims of a well-organized government, 
and ought never to be founded in a forced construction, must less in opposition to a fair 
one” (Madison, Helvidius #2, 68). Separation of powers keeps the government organized 
and effective, so the alleged encroachment, and potential usurpation, of a congressional 
power by George Washington in this case creates alarm in Madison as it oversteps the 
system he worked to get into place.  
Overall, Madison’s commitment to the separation of powers, and a limited 
Legislature, becomes obvious throughout The Federalist Papers, but in retrospect, he 
begins to contradict his idea of an empowered Executive when discussing the treaty-
making power in The Pacificus-Helvidius debates. 
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Conclusion 
While Alexander Hamilton and James Madison have concurrent thought-
processes throughout The Federalist Papers, their ideas begin to separate when 
examining the treaty-making power in the Pacificus-Helvidius Debates. They both fear 
an over-energetic Legislative, which is prominent in the individual states’ governments, 
and therefore require an energetic Executive to mitigate this danger as well as execute 
government in a swift and unhindered fashion. Madison’s focus on and commitment to 
separation of powers is clear, as he prescribes to the rule of law being above all in normal 
circumstances. He states that creating treaties is the same as creating a law, just in the 
international realm, which is why it should be considered an inherent Legislative power, 
and therefore, a Legislative power in the United States government. Hamilton supports 
the separation of powers system and accountability from all branches, but differs in that 
he finds the Executive to be basically unhindered on the international front, and does not 
believe the treaty-making power is inherently a Legislative power. Hamilton wants to 
integrate the ambitious into the government, and allow for sufficiently flexible 
constitutionalism to allow the government to achieve the public good128. He says, “The 
best security for the fidelity of mankind is to make their interest coincide with their duty” 
(Hamilton, Federalist #72). Both of their beliefs are characterized by an energetic 
Executive; however, the extent to which they want to give the Executive the freedom to 
enact swift governance and judgments is where the difference between the two occurs. 
128 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 115 
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When looking at President Obama reforming immigration law through Executive 
decree, it becomes understandable that they both would not be in support of his alleged 
legal usage of his prerogative power. In the case of Alexander Hamilton, there would be a 
slight unpredictability in his response to Obama’s Executive order. This is primarily 
because of the fact that although immigration is not an existential threat, Obama was 
elected by the people to govern the United States, and a significant number of citizens 
and constituents desire for the reform of immigration law as soon as possible through 
usage of prerogative power. Moreover, if the Executive believes that it will be in the best 
interest of the nation, Hamilton seems to support the idea that action should be taken. 
That being said, I still do not believe that Hamilton would approve of Obama’s actions, 
primarily because it is such an obvious and explicit overstepping of the separation of 
powers, and the precedent that could potentially be set by doing this. The United States’ 
Constitution explicitly prescribes the power to make the laws to the Legislative branch of 
the federal government, and there is no ambiguity on which an argument can be 
formulated within the constitutional framework allowing for President Obama to usurp 
this power to achieve his own political ends, or for any other reason not involving a true 
existential crisis. There are also a significant number of citizens and constituents that 
openly do not want Obama to overstep his constitutional grounds to complete this reform, 
which would likely play a role in Hamilton’s decision to support or condemn Obama. 
Hamilton is still a strong supporter of the separation of powers ideals, and Obama’s 
outright ignorance of the ideals that the United States Constitution is based upon would 
violate what he even would find acceptable of the Executive. 
63 
 
As for James Madison, it is clearly articulated in The Federalist Papers that he is 
a full supporter of the separation of powers being entrenched in the Constitution, also in 
support of giving the Executive power when either an instance of Legislative 
encroachment or an existential crisis occurs. In this case, the separation of powers would 
reign supreme, as Obama is directly going around the separation of powers system, and 
the unambiguous and direct words of the Constitution, as creating laws is explicitly stated 
as a Legislative power. There is clearly no existential crisis occurring, as immigration 
does not provide any major danger to the Union as a whole. His belief becomes more 
concrete after looking at The Pacificus-Helvidius debates as he clearly states that the law-
making power is always a Legislative power, and the Executive has no correct time when 
he can overstep the system to create laws of his own. He also would fear the precedent 
that this direct encroachment of power would set, as future President’s now have the 
ability to look at what Obama has done, and cite it for even larger separation of powers 
violations. Obama’s usurpation of power is the exact instance that Madison created and 
instituted the separation of powers to combat, and it obviously follows that he would not 
support the decision. 
In the end, I do not think that either of these Founding Fathers, whether it be with 
Madison’s obvious commitment to the separation of powers, or Hamilton’s idea of a 
strong Executive that has the authority to act domestically, would support President 
Obama in his usage of Executive prerogative to reform immigration law. Obama’s 
violation of the separation of powers would not be acceptable to either of these two men, 
as the founding document of the United States explicitly states the congressional law-
making power. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN 
PRESIDENCY DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND THE 
GEORGE W. BUSH PRESIDENCY DURING THE “WAR 
ON TERROR” 
Throughout the history of the United States of America, the usage of unilateral 
Executive action has occurred on several different occasions, and the results have been 
diverse both in the success in combating the initial issue and in the general view of the 
action’s constitutionality. Some successful examples include Washington’s Proclamation 
on Neutrality and the resolution of the volatile Cuban Missile Crisis129; however, some 
unsuccessful examples exist as well, such as Harry Truman’s attempt at seizing private 
property in the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer case, and the Iran-Contra 
Scandal130. In this thesis, a successful example of Executive discretionary authority being 
used is one that is justifiable to the people and undertaken within the confounds of a 
constitutionally justifiable crisis, and utilized out of necessity because the Executive 
needs to direct the nation with efficiency. It is almost a nationwide consensus that the 
most successful usage of the prerogative power is President Lincoln’s actions during the 
Civil War, as the Union was in the midst of an existential crisis. His usages of prerogative 
set the standard for what has since been deemed a successful instance of exercising 
Executive authority. During this period, Lincoln provided strong justifications for his 
unilateral presidential actions by emphasizing the necessity of what he was doing 
129 Shane, 5 
130 Shane, 18 
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primarily to the other branches of the federal government, but also to the people. The 
President took action under three principles; authority outside of and especially against 
the Constitution is only constitutional when the Union itself is at risk; the Constitution 
should be understood as different during extraordinary times compared to ordinary times; 
and a line must separate the Executive’s personal feelings and official duty131. While it 
was necessary for the perseverance of the United States at the time, Lincoln’s presidency 
provided a dangerous precedent for subsequent leaders of the Executive branch in 
usurping the other branches’ powers, as John Locke expressed his fear that something of 
this magnitude when he said, “That the reigns of good princes have been always most 
dangerous to the liberties of their people: for when their successors, managing the 
government with different thoughts, would draw the actions of those good rulers into 
precedent, and make them the standard of their prerogative, as if what had been done 
only for the good of the people was a right in them to do….” (Locke, Section 166). James 
Madison also expressed his fear through his constant articulation of the importance of 
separation of powers, and the condemnation of at the very least ambiguous uses of 
Executive authority.  
A recent example is the usage of Executive prerogative by George W. Bush and 
his administration between 2000 and 2008, as it was one of the most aggressive 
presidential assertions of power in United States history. Bush’s administration, instead 
of acknowledging the necessity of his prerogative along the lines of President Lincoln, 
attempted to legalize his actions post-September 11 tragedy by declaring a “’War’ on 
131 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 184 
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Terror”132. The administration cited the words of Alexander Hamilton and other original 
constitutional thinkers in a misconstruing fashion, and emphasized the necessity of 
preserving the Union during an alleged time of war133. Bush used these justifications on 
both the domestic and international fronts, therefore resulting in backlash from internal 
and external pundits, as many believed that he overstepped the constitutional limits 
prescribed to the President through manipulation and deceit134. Following the Bush 
administration’s abuses of prerogative power, Barack Obama instituted a platform that 
involved him condemning these abuses, saying that on the international front, the 
President is responsive to Congress and the Constitution. Since then, Obama’s true views 
may have come to fruition, or he could simply have realized that he cannot make change 
in the country during his time in office under this approach. Obama has examined Bush’s 
administration and it has paved the way for him to believe in the legality of using 
unilateral Executive actions to reform immigration law while overstepping the separation 
of powers, albeit utilizing different methods of justification. The Lincoln 
Administration’s justified uses of prerogative led to examples that have not been nearly 
as successful or accepted, and now President Obama has now begun to legalize his usage 
of Executive authority while attempting to show that it coincide with congressional 
priorities in governance using an alternative approach 
 
. 
132 Shane, 69 
133 Shane, 69 
134 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 1-2 
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President Lincoln- Justified Usage of Executive Prerogative 
The Civil War stands as the event that most jeopardized the continuation of the 
United States constitutional order, and luckily, Abraham Lincoln was at the helm of the 
country with the willingness to do whatever it took to preserve the Union while 
successfully justifying his actions. Before his presidency commenced, Lincoln was a 
member of the Whig party—one of the central planks of the party was that Presidents 
should remain deferential to Congress in matters of both domestic and foreign policy, of 
which Lincoln showed his support for during the Mexican-American War135. Contrary to 
his actions during his time as President, Lincoln repeatedly stated that there should not be 
presidential involvement in Legislative activities and that the Mexican-American War 
was unnecessarily and unconstitutionally initiated by President James Polk136. The 
Constitution is explicit that a President, at least in regard to war with foreign nations, 
must be controlled by more than the individuals impression as to what public good 
constitutes137. Lincoln, in the case of his disapproval, distinguishes between a foreign and 
domestic conflict and the congressional need to approve any action on the foreign front, 
which eliminates the potential for highlighting his hypocrisy when examining his true 
beliefs in future actions. However, Lincoln implies that the general public is not a 
dependable judge of constitutionality when left to its own devices, primarily in the case 
of President Polk because he violated the Constitution when attacking Mexico without 
consulting Congress, yet because he was successful, the public ignored the violation138. 
135 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 175 
136 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 175 
137 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 176 
138 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 177 
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Polk then refused to defend himself, which angered Lincoln more than any other aspect 
because by doing this, Polk implied that he was the sole judge of the necessity of his 
action, and did not provide any sort of constitutional defense139. Once Lincoln was 
elected President, and was faced with a much more significant threat to the existence of 
the United States, he in turn would go on to violate the constitutional powers explicitly 
given to him as the Executive domestically, but because his ultimate goal was to preserve 
the Union, he was successfully able to justify the actions, unlike President Polk was to 
him during the Mexican-American War.  
The Southern Secession crisis began when Lincoln was elected President, as a 
partisan divide on his election arose; Southerners viewed his election as constitutionally 
illegitimate, and a preemptive act of war calculated to instigate slave rebellion through 
unlimited exercises of Executive power140; on the other hand, Republican’s viewed his 
election as an affirmation of constitutional orthodoxy which, through responsible exercise 
of Executive duties, could restore national politics while defusing threats of disunionism 
from the South141. Before Lincoln was able to step into office, James Buchanan was the 
constitutionally sworn President, and he differed greatly from Lincoln in his view of 
Executive and presidential powers in extraordinary circumstances142. During this time, 
the withdrawal of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and 
Texas, all cotton states other than South Carolina, occurred and brought the government 
to a standstill143. Buchanan approached the situation in a completely different fashion 
139 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 177 
140 Belz, 14 
141 Belz, 14 
142 Belz, 14 
143 Belz, 14 
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than Lincoln would once inaugurated, as he stated in his annual message to Congress that 
the responsibility and true position of the Executive was to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed, and that no human power could absolve the President of this 
obligation144. He denied Executive responsibility for resolving the constitutional crisis in 
this message, saying “The Executive has no authority to decide what shall be the relations 
between the federal government and South Carolina… He possesses no power to change 
the relations heretofore existing between them, much less acknowledge the independence 
of that State”145. Buchanan’s beliefs about the Executive coincide strongly with a limited 
presidency within the separation of powers with no consideration of extenuating. The 
declaration of war displays that this may not be in the country’s best interest at all times, 
because although Lincoln initially denied the existence of a constitutional crisis, once he 
acknowledged it and took action, the Union was eventually saved and the crisis averted. 
President Lincoln, once he took office, adopted a strategy of Executive 
minimalism that reduced his ability to bring the discombobulated parts of the country 
under the control of the federal government146. In his first inaugural address, he reiterated 
the theme of formal Executive restraint, saying, “I hold, that in contemplation of 
universal law, and of the Constitution, the Union of these States is perpetual. Perpetuity is 
implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law of all national governments… I 
therefore consider that, in view of the Constitution and the laws, the Union is 
unbroken…I will continue to execute all the express provisions of our national 
144 Belz, 16 
145Buchanan, James, “Fourth Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union”, 
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Constitution, and the Union will endure forever—it being possible to destroy it, except by 
some action not provided for in the instrument itself…The Chief Magistrate derives all 
his authority from the people, and they have conferred none upon him to fix the terms for 
the separation of the States”147. While Lincoln may have believed that the people did not 
confer in him the power necessary to act unilaterally, there were many in the North whom 
wanted to abandon the Constitution because they thought it systematically prevented the 
strong response necessary to keeping the southern slaveholders in line148. Others didn’t 
want to necessarily abandon the founding document entirely, but instead reinterpret its 
structures so that it could become a constitutional dictatorship with the capabilities to 
combat crises such as the Civil War149. Lincoln at the outset was attempting to establish a 
rapport for not abusing Executive power by going outside of the explicit legal obligations 
that the Constitution created and operating within the implicit obligations, but because of 
a singular focus on necessity, and determining the true constitutional meaning regarding 
the continuation of the Union via his commitment to statesmanship, he abandoned the 
congressional deference with which he entered his presidency150.  
Statesmanship is defined as political action for the good of the community based 
on the virtues of practicality and political reason, and under the American Constitution, 
147 Lincoln, Abraham, “First Inaugural Address”, http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres31.html, March 4,1861 
148 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary Presidency”, 188 
149 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary Presidency”, 188 
150 Kleinerman, Benjamin, “Lincoln’s Example: Executive Power and the Survival of Constitutionalism”, 
Perspectives on Politics, American Political Science Association, 2005, 
http://ry6af4uu9w.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-
8&rfr_id=info:sid/ProQ%3Awpsashell&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.jtit
le=Perspectives+on+Politics&rft.atitle=Lincoln%27s+Example%3A+Executive+Power+and+the+Survival
+of+Constitutionalism&rft.au=Kleinerman%2C+Benjamin+A&rft.aulast=Kleinerman&rft.aufirst=Benjami
n&rft.date=2005-12-
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the statesman is concerned to maintain the principles, goods, customs, traditions, and acts 
of foundation that compose the priorities of republican governance151. Under the altering 
circumstances of American nationality during the Civil War crisis, President Lincoln’s 
role as a statesman led to the nation having to decide the fundamental answer to the 
Secession movement, as the Constitution neither confers nor prohibits the right of a state 
to secede from the Union, nor does it authorize or deny the right of the federal 
government to stop a state or group of states from seceding152.  
As soon as Lincoln realized that the Civil War was a true existential crisis for the 
United States, and the necessity for him to undertake Executive action outside of the legal 
presets of the Constitution became apparent, he was finally convinced that only this 
necessity could justify his actions, not public approval or congressional legislation153. In 
his mind, through the existence of the Habeas Corpus Clause, the Constitution points to 
the goal of preservation, as well as makes a distinction between ordinary and 
extraordinary times154. Following from this, Lincoln realized that “No organic law can 
ever be framed with a provision specifically applicable to every question, which may 
occur in practical administration. No foresight can anticipate, nor any document of 
reasonable length contain, express provisions for all possible questions”155. Because of 
the rule of law’s inability to adequately prescribe solutions to all issues, Lincoln 
constantly referred to the fact that the people of the United States, through deciding to 
elect him as President, chose to condemn the secession of the Southern states, and it was 
151 Belz, 20-21 
152 Belz, 21-22 
153 Kleinerman, “Executive Prerogative and the Survival of Constitutionalism”, 806 
154 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 179 
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his duty to carry out popular will while perpetuating the Union through Executive 
actions156. The justification for his actions rests heavily on the distinction between 
“ordinary” and “extraordinary” circumstances, and President Lincoln believed that 
maintaining this critical distinction substantially removed the dangers of his actions and 
allows them to become constitutionally acceptable157. Lincoln’s commitment to the rule 
of law in all ordinary circumstances allowed for him to cite the extraordinary in the case 
of the Civil War, which therefore gave him the ability to take over at the helm of the 
government within the parameters of the Constitution. 
To begin the Civil War, President Lincoln sent a commercial ship with provisions 
to Fort Sumter with orders not to return fire if attacked, as he understood the strategic and 
moral necessity of inducing the South to fire the first shots of the war that had basically 
already begun158. Southern high command ordered an attack on the ship sent by the 
North, therefore proving peaceable secession to be impossible, and displaying the 
political and legal situation the country was now facing in full159. The offensive attack on 
a supply ship cleared the way for Lincoln to step into the situation with the power of 
retaliation rather than being the aggressor, and granted him the ability to utilize the 
Executive prerogative power to sustain the United States. His construction of the 
Executive power conformed to the design and intent of the Constitution: Article IX, 
Section IV, says, “The United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a 
Republic Form of Government”160. This section established the republican principal as a 
156 Belz, 27 
157 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 180 
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national political standard that implicated the meaning of liberty, equality, and consent as 
principles of self-government—Lincoln understood that the republican government 
needed to be preserved and that the integrity of the Union depended on and required an 
understanding of these principles161. 
On April 15, 1861, Lincoln published the Proclamation Calling Militia and 
Convening Congress under the Militia Act of 1795, which announced the purpose of 
executing the laws of the United States, and stated that combinations too powerful to be 
suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers given to the 
Executive by the Constitution, obstructed enforcement of the laws in the seven “seceded” 
states162. Later on, he stated that slavery not only violated the simple human liberty rights 
of blacks, but also circumscribed republican equality and consent by giving, through the 
existence of the three-fifths system of representation under the Constitution, a privileged 
position to owners of slave property and citizens of slave states163. After this, Lincoln 
waited to call a joint session of Congress because he thought the war would be over by 
July 4, 1861 (the date he chose for the session)164. He made the date this late so that he 
could avoid potential delays, a weakened war effort, and extreme deliberation that would 
inevitably arise with the inclusion of the Legislature165. On April 19, Lincoln created a 
blockade on the ports of the seceded states to protect the lives, property, and public peace 
in the United States; on April 20, he ordered a total of nineteen vessels to be added to the 
Navy immediately along with directing the Secretary of the Treasury to advance $2 
161 Belz, 34 
162 Belz, 34-36 
163 Belz, 36 
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million of unappropriated funds to three private citizens of New York whom had the sole 
responsibility to use the money to finance government military operations without 
congressional approval; on April 22, the blockade mentioned previously was extended to 
the ports of Virginia and North Carolina; on April 27, he suspended Habeas Corpus to 
maintain public order and suppress open treason in the Union after classifying 
secessionists as violators of the law; on May 3, he used the powers typically reserved to 
Congress in raising an army and providing a navy, followed by regulating the distribution 
of mail166. 
Lincoln decided to issue these Executive decrees and begin to use Executive 
prerogative while Congress was not in session, although he and his allies in the Senate 
and House of Representatives were able to arrive at the argument that the presidential war 
power maintained constitutionalism better than the congressional war power167. They 
contended that the President is uniquely capable of limiting actions to those necessary 
and because the individual in the position can be held solely accountable for the actions 
that the Executive decides to undertake168. That being said, he truly believed the conflict 
would be under control by July 4, when Congress was scheduled to reconvene, but it 
ended up persisting for longer than expected. However, when Congress did finally meet, 
President Lincoln defended his actions to them as constitutional under the war powers of 
the government, and clarified that his decisions were based on necessity due to the non-
peaceful form of resolution the Southerners desired169. He urged them to give him legal 
166 DePlato, 104-106 
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sanction for the Executive authority utilized for the sake of preserving the Union, while 
also demonstrating restraint and regret in acting this way170: “It was with the deepest 
regret that the Executive found the duty of employing the war-power, in defense of the 
government, forced upon him. He could but perform this duty, or surrender the existence 
of government”171.  He then strategically placed the onus to perform the congressional 
duty of legitimizing Lincoln’s actions by saying, “You will now, according to your own 
judgment, perform yours. He sincerely hopes that your views, and your action, may so 
accord with his, as to assure all faithful citizens, who have been disturbed in their rights, 
of a certain, and speedy restoration to them, under the Constitution and the laws”172. In 
response to this letter from Lincoln, Congress, on August 6, 1861, registered approval of 
all the acts, proclamations, and order of the President respecting the Army and Navy of 
the United States and calling out or relating to the militia or volunteers of the United 
States, giving Lincoln exactly what he requested173. Clearly, from these words and his 
actions, Lincoln adhered closely to Hamilton’s vision of emergency power and Executive 
energy during time of peril and he was able to constitutionally defend the powers 
exercised174. Nevertheless, Lincoln’s strategic, true, and consistent expressions of regret 
and restraint clearly appealed to the Legislative, as they validated his usage of Executive 
prerogative to complete the tasks necessary to preserve the Union that they themselves 
were unable to complete. In the end, their decision resulted in the seceding states 
170 DePlato, 107 
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returning and the continued existence of the democratic republic that was known as the 
Union. 
Congress had previously tried to derail the separation of powers by implementing 
laws such as the Second Confiscation Act of Spring 1862, where the institution attempted 
to take property from the southerners attempting secession175. This was considered an 
attempted congressional dictatorship, and the bill was condemned by many as it is 
explicitly prohibited in the Constitution for this kind of action to be undertaken176. For 
Congress to pass certain laws during emergencies, such as the case of seizing the 
property (including slaves) of all rebels, overruns strict constitutional limitations—In this 
case, Lincoln’s seizure of property, when it became necessary to do so for the prosecution 
of the war, does not suffer from the same sort of constitutional dilemma177. Because of 
the Legislative’s inherent inability to act with swiftness and energy towards the 
preservation of the Union, and to be held fully accountable, Lincoln found it necessary 
for him to be in control of mitigating the existential crisis that the Civil War became. 
Through trusting his own capacities to only allow himself to obtain the power during the 
crisis, he was able to successfully coerce, using force and strategy, the secession states 
back into the original Union. Lincoln, as a President with the previously unestablished 
and unutilized prerogative powers, decided to suspend Habeas Corpus, raise an army and 
invade, establish a military government in a captured territory, and employed tough 
internal security measures without the consultation of Congress, partially because they 
were not in session, and partially because he understood the necessity of him acting 
175 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 194 
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instantly before the war process moved too far forwards178. He was able to justify these 
actions because the South was not seceding due to discontent with the style of 
governance (a democratic government still persisted), but rather because of specific 
ideals and beliefs that Lincoln was elected President unfairly and was set on eliminating 
slavery. 
President Lincoln famously asked the question, after the Civil War was over, 
“Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its own people or too 
weak to maintain its own existence?”179. This question has further diversified the 
arguments over the legality of his usage of Executive discretionary authority, and 
whether subsequent usages of Executive discretionary authority are acceptable. When 
utilizing the prerogative power to combat the Southern Secession crisis, Lincoln 
repeatedly articulated the need for his Executive orders to be understood as a 
constitutionally acceptable supplement to the rule of law that only applied in 
circumstances where the rule of law had no previously prescribed judgment as the powers 
were exercised out of necessity180. He says, “These measures, whether strictly legal or 
not, were ventured upon, under what appeared to be a popular demand, and a public 
necessity; trusting, then as now, that Congress would readily ratify them. It is believed 
that nothing has been done beyond the constitutional competency of Congress”181. 
Further, when writing about his justification for the Emancipation Proclamation, he 
claimed the necessity of this action only possible to be exercised during war. This was 
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not an obvious usurpation of power, as it is unclear whether Congress had the power 
during peacetime, but because of the crisis facing the nation, Lincoln undertook the 
power to weaken the Southern states. He said, “I felt that measures, otherwise 
unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of 
the Constitution, through the preservation of the nation”182. Lincoln was attempting to 
create a certain constitutional standard by which future claims of prerogative could be 
examined183.  While he technically did so, the ability of later presidents to skew his 
words and actions has absolutely given them a style of precedent that can justify 
unilateral action to those that aren’t entrenched with knowledge of what actually was said 
and done during his presidency.  
Lincoln feared, as those who created the constitutional structure did, the usage of 
a precedent of positive prerogative power as justification for later abuses of the power, as 
he compared the attraction to Executive power to the human attraction to drugs in that is 
great but addictive184. Ultimately, an overuse of drugs will make a human sick, and the 
Executive power does the same, especially because the growth of the discretionary 
prerogative power has a positive correlation with the likelihood that a power hungry 
Executive will utilize it in an arbitrary manner that does not seek the public good185. 
Unfortunately for Lincoln, effective conduct in the Executive office transcended the 
previously existing dichotomy between formal restraint and informal initiative for 
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preserving the government in the constitutionally prescribed Executive structure186. On 
the other hand, the departure from the Constitution, and the separation of powers, 
renewed the people’s attachment to the notion of limits on governmental power at the 
time, but it did not persist. The constant discussion about prerogative legality, as well as 
the return to constitutionalism that Lincoln embodied, allowed for the rule of law to 
return with more fervor than before the incident187. Successful constitutions require 
popular attachment, especially to avert the ambitions of those few who would destroy the 
constitutional order to fulfill their own ambition or even to promote what they think is the 
public good188. However, as the Bush Administration, and now the Obama 
Administration, have displayed, Lincoln’s massive expansion of previously unutilized 
Executive prerogative power set the precedent that the original constitutionalists feared; 
as the power expands over time and usage, there will be more and more violations of the 
original justification for the power, and eventually, the Constitution could lose its 
meaning within society and Executive power could become the ultimate governmental 
power in the United States. 
President Bush- Unjustified Usage of Executive Prerogative 
While the Lincoln Administration was a successful, and constitutionally 
acceptable, example of the extreme use of Executive prerogative during an existential 
crisis, there have been multiple attempts at using the power to strictly political ends, 
which is the exact precedent that Lincoln was trying to avoid. An example of the 
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questionable usage of Executive authority, and what is known to some as one of the most 
aggressive presidential assertions of power in history189, is that which occurred during the 
administration of George W. Bush, the 43rd President of the United States. The Bush 
administration, in a similar fashion to Lincoln, attempted to justify usage of Executive 
prerogative by claiming that the nation was at “war” and that he was exercising the war-
powers constitutionally prescribed to the President in times of crisis out of necessity. The 
administration’s actions since the acts of terror that occurred on September 11, 2011, 
caused many scholars and commentators to reexamine the questions concerning the 
proper sphere of Executive power within the system of separation of powers190. As the 
presidency preceding the election of Barack Obama, Bush attempted to legalize all of his 
uses of Executive discretion, and made many different assertions to justify his emergency 
power by relying on Alexander Hamilton’s interpretation of Executive emergency power 
in The Federalist Papers with John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government in a skewed 
fashion191. By referencing Hamilton as a Founding Father, and John Locke as an original 
constitutionalist thinker, the administration claimed the legality of their decision to define 
the enemy, act against the enemy in a superficial state of war, imprison the enemy 
indefinitely without legal processes and under any conditions, and prevent review of any 
of these discretionary actions by the Courts192. The Bush Administration utilized the 
Unitary Executive theory, which claims that the Executive has the lawful right to 
completely control and administer the duties of his office without congressional oversight 
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or consultation193; however, this theory only applies to existential times of a true crisis, 
such as the Civil War, and the “’War’ on Terror” and does not constitute an existential 
crisis for the United States of America.  
President Bush’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) provides constitutional legal 
advice to all of the departments within the Executive Branch of the federal government, 
as well as both written and oral advice to the Counsel of the President194. Since leaving 
office, Bush has often stated that the lawyers, and primarily John Yoo, advised him on his 
constitutional authority regarding his emergency power195. But, even though the OLC has 
the primary responsibility of protecting the President from congressional encroachments 
of power, they are not the ultimate authority in these cases196. The administration, in the 
attempts to legalize Executive discretionary actions, blurred the lines of what is 
understood as domestic and foreign in nature to justify the actions undertaken—In one of 
Bush’s radio addresses, he says, “In this first war of the 21st century, one of the most 
critical battlefields is on the home front”197. By using this claim of a “war” from the 
September 11 attacks, the OLC at the time began to construct the argument that the usage 
of Executive authority would be unlimited, not only on the foreign front, but domestically 
because the distinction between foreign and domestic now allegedly doesn’t apply in the 
same fashion198. 
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To begin their argument, John Yoo, head of the OLC under President Bush, 
drafted an advisory memorandum regarding the President’s authority to use emergency 
powers on October 23, 2001, following the attacks of September, 11, 2001, called 
“Authority for Use of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities within the United 
States of America”199.  Preceding this was the “The Constitutionality of Amending 
Foreign Surveillance Act to Change the Purpose Standard Searches” memorandum, 
issued on September 25, 2001200. The OLC continued establishing memorandums like 
this, such as on November 15 of the same year, when they published the “Authority of 
the President to Suspend Certain Provisions of the Anti-Ballistic Missiles treaty”, 
followed by “Determination of Enemy Belligerence and Military Detention” on June 8, 
2002, “the President’s Power as Commander in Chief to Transfer Captured Terrorists to 
the Control and Custody of Foreign Nations” on March 13, 2002, and “The Swift Justice 
Act” on April 8, 2002201. Throughout the memorandums, the OLC selectively referred to 
The Federalist Papers contextualized through unrelated other papers and documents to 
construct an interpretation of Hamilton’s and Locke’s words to favor the argument that 
the Executive is all powerful during these scenarios, even though it was not successfully 
justified as a true existential crisis202. In regards to Locke, Yoo claimed that he first 
observed that a constitution ought to give the foreign affairs power to the Executive 
because foreign threats are much less capable to be directed by standing laws, with the 
argument being predicated on the distinction between an internal Executive power and an 
external Federative power, a distinction which the Bush Administration completely 
199 DePlato, 132-133 
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ignored203. Locke’s willingness to give more leeway to the Executive, as was mentioned 
previously, is dependent upon this distinction, which shows the ambiguity that Yoo 
approached the attempts at justification. Bush would then initiate what would later 
become known as the Bush Doctrine, which resulted in the subsequent United States 
invasion of Afghanistan to topple the Taliban regime (Operation Enduring Freedom)204.   
Directly after the September 11 attacks, the administration pursued legislation 
from Congress to empower the federal government in responding to potential threats 
domestically and internationally, which resulted in the Patriot Act205. The 2001 Patriot 
Act was 324 pages of legislation written by the White House and pushed through 
Congress without any formal drafts from congressional leadership206. It gave the 
Executive Branch extensive and secret power to act without warrants in the pursuit of 
terrorist counterintelligence which included NSA wiretaps, granting the Executive the 
power to allow federal agencies to intercept wire, oral, and electronic communications 
relating to terrorism, computer fraud, and abuse, and allowed for the outsourcing of high-
value detainees to third party states that use torture or aggressive interrogation207. In 
regards to outsourcing of prisoners, detainees were sent to Egypt, Syria, Thailand, 
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Jordan, and Pakistan—all nations that use torture 
as one of their mechanisms to gather intelligence information208. Through this act and the 
frequent memorandums, the Executive branch spent most of its energy insisting on the 
inherent legality of such actions through precedent and the Founding Fathers. 
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Nevertheless, they attempted to provide reasoning to the Legislature on why these were 
necessary actions as the original separation of powers structure intended209. The “Dirty 
War” treatment and tactics involved violations of multiple human rights laws and various 
customary international legal rights and proscriptions reflected in other relevant 
treaties210. These acts violated international agreements that the United States explicitly 
consented to being applied to their actions long before. Although Bush was acting in the 
foreign domain, the Bush administration overstepped the constitutional bounds of 
Executive capabilities in foreign affairs, while also creating a negative perception and 
reputation of the United States around the world. 
Domestically, the NSA wiretapping provided a major constitutional issue because 
it legalized the American people having their privacy rights violated without 
constitutional justification211. Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA) in 1978, and allowed for repeated amendments to be made since September 11, 
2001, which have given administrations extreme leeway in their surveillance of United 
States citizens and non-citizens in America212. The Act was amended in 2001 via the 
Patriot Act, so as to include terrorist groups that are not specifically backed by a foreign 
government—in other words, the amendment gave the NSA the ability to wiretap 
basically any citizen by citing vague “suspicion” of terrorist collaboration213. Congress, 
when approving the passage of this act and following amendments, thought that they 
were restraining presidential discretion, but instead created secret courts and easy access 
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to warrant wiretapping with almost no justification, which are inherently constitutionally 
unacceptable and a violation of citizen’s rights214. If wiretapping was purely limited to 
the foreign realm, then it would be considered espionage, which is widely accepted and 
has never been seriously questioned constitutionally215. By changing the language of 
FISA from “the primary purpose” of information gathering to be national security to a 
“significant purpose”, the Patriot Act made the governmental burden in obtaining FISA 
warrants extremely low216. The transfer of espionage to domestic monitoring of normal 
United States citizens play a major role in the argument of the illegality of the Bush 
administration’s actions, and have potentially paved the way for further constitutional 
violations to become acceptable, so long as the Legislature approves at the time.  
Congress, through the enactment of these statutes and acts, also transferred its 
responsibility of judging the Executive over to the Judicial Branch. The Judicial Branch 
has very different political logic from the Legislative, and the Supreme Court became the 
primary institution in attempting to check the Executive, a difficult task for the Judiciary 
to undertake217. The Court gaining this control discouraged the political accountability of 
both Congress and the President that comes through political contestation, a crucial part 
of the separation of powers that James Madison originally outlined in The Federalist 
Papers and is implied through the constitutional structure218. Executive discretion must 
be judged politically, and the Courts are inherently unable to make political judgments 
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and still remain Courts219. In addition, John Locke specifically condemned the 
Legislature transferring its powers to other branches in a liberal constitutional 
government220. If an unconstitutional or illegal action comes in front of the Courts, it 
would likely be better for them to judge it via the Constitution, as opposed to the political 
necessity, which in the case of George W. Bush would have condemned most, if not all, 
of his “wartime” unilaterally enacted actions.  
The Bush administration’s idea that Executive discretion is inherently legal, and 
the fact that they justified his usage of prerogative by referring to a vague “war” which 
didn’t present a direct threat to the United States, sets a precedent that future presidents of 
the United States may be able to utilize in their increasing expansions of Executive 
prerogative, which creates the ultimate danger for the country in that the Executive can 
eventually reach an illimitable power. The OLC was correct in claiming that 
discretionary power lies within the presidency in extraordinary circumstances, but they 
were wrong to imply that this power cannot be judged no matter the circumstances, and 
to claim the situation they were in as an existential crisis221. President Lincoln feared that 
his precedent would allow for a president like this to arise, as he openly stated that 
Executive authority is supposed to be justified to Congress, as well as judged by the 
people, so as to ensure the legitimacy of the actions. However, in this case, none of that 
was done, as an insistence on the President’s inherent ability to be unlimited in his usage 
of this power clearly became a commonality, and even though the majority of it took 
place on the foreign front, there was no truly existential crisis. 
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Since the Bush presidency has ended, there have been many pundits attempting to 
assert literature that signifies the direct constitutional violations that were committed, and 
many have made in depth arguments for impeachment and prosecution for George W. 
Bush. In this fashion, Congressman Dennis Kucinich published a book titled “35 Articles 
of Impeachment and the Case for Prosecuting George W. Bush”, where he cited 
violations such as Article II of the Constitution in multiple sections, Article I of the 
Constitution in multiple sections, and numerous federal statues, international treaties, and 
congressionally established Acts222. The amount of laws that the Bush Administration 
violated, nonetheless during a time that did not qualify under the criteria of a true crisis, 
is astronomically high. These violations have created a heated debate over what the true 
limits on the Executive prerogative power are when an argument can be crafted to 
circumscribe them in now what seems to be any situation. President Bush and his 
Executive branch did exactly what John Locke, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, 
and Abraham Lincoln feared would be possible with the existence of the Executive 
power, and now has set a precedent for President Obama to condemn foreign usage of the 
power, but instead, authorize domestic usage and continue the weakening of the 
separation of powers.  
Conclusion 
Abraham Lincoln set a precedent that was absolutely necessary for the 
preservation of the Union during the Civil War, as the nation was threatening to become 
divided without the consent of all citizens. However, as Hugh Gallagher has written, 
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“The danger of allowing a president like Lincoln to act without regard to constitutional 
restraints in a great crisis is that lesser men may take Lincoln as a precedent in lesser 
causes”223. While there have been smaller violations that involved Executive 
discretionary authority being utilized, in the case of the Bush administration, there had 
never been such an outright usage of prerogative and ambiguous justification of a 
“crisis”. The Lincoln administration unfortunately paved the way for this type of 
violation. Lincoln clearly would be against Obama’s usage of the Executive power to 
reform immigration law, as there is absolutely no sign of an existential crisis, and Obama 
completely overstepped the explicitly congressional power of law-making in taking his 
actions, although he did provide legal “justification” through a unique and unprecedented 
reading of congressional priorities in immigration law. Obama is working to achieve a 
policy goal, which goes against the separation of powers along with the entire idea of the 
Constitution. Because of the Bush administration’s obvious violations of Executive 
authority on the international front, Obama was able to run his platform off of his 
condemnation of these actions, but now, he is using the precedent set by Bush on the 
domestic front, with a differing method of legally justifying his actions.  
Obama is stepping over the separation of powers principles that are entrenched in 
the Constitution without the existence of a crisis, and usurping congressional power. The 
definition of a crisis, and of successful usage of prerogative, is of upmost importance, and 
examining Lincoln’s crisis of the continuation of the Union to Bush’s “War on Terror” 
and Obama’s immigration law situation, it is clear that the latter two pale in comparison. 
In Bush’s case, there is no threat of the destruction of the Union, and while the “War on 
223 Kleinerman, “Lincoln’s Example: executive Power and the Survival of Constitutionalism”, 803 
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Terror” will be positive for the United States on the international front and gives a very 
small amount of validation in claiming that the nation is at “war”, it doesn’t validate 
domestic violations of civil rights that are expressly given in the Constitution, nor does it 
allow for the violations of international treaties that have been agreed to by previous 
leaders. In Obama’s case, there is absolutely no danger to the Constitution, the Union, or 
any significant number of people—there is no threat to the people even in this case, other 
than a sheer uncomfortableness. He has taken a different approach than both Lincoln and 
Bush as he is claiming the priorities of immigration law, rather than inciting the 
immigration issue as a crisis or some sort of danger to the nation. As for successful 
prerogative, Lincoln’s time in office set the standards of success; actions taken out of 
necessity for the preservation of the Union, actions justifiable to the people, and 
utilization of powers given to the Executive during a crisis endangering the nation. 
However, it is Congress’ constitutionally prescribed power to make the laws, and since 
there is no extraordinary circumstance, Obama should not have the ability to overstep the 
separation of powers and reform immigration law.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION  
The President of the United States of America is called “the most powerful man in 
the world” for good reason, as he leads the most powerful country in all international 
interactions, and is viewed to be the driver behind domestic politics. However, within the 
separation of powers system established by the Constitution, the position of the 
presidency is one of deadlock when it comes to creating change inside the boundaries of 
the nation. As Woodrow Wilson writes in his President of the United States, “The makers 
of the Constitution constructed the federal government upon a theory of checks and 
balances which was meant to limit the operation of each part and allow no single part or 
organ of it a dominating force…The President is balanced off against Congress, Congress 
against the President, and each against the Courts” (Wilson, 54, 56224). The constitutional 
separation of powers system is based around preventing Legislative and/or Executive 
tyranny, so that the democratic republic form of governance can remain and the nation 
can be operated with some semblance of fairness. That being said, there are still times 
where the nation needs a strong individual to be able to make quick efficient decisions to 
enact effective governance. This role falls upon the President, as he is unhindered by 
others playing the same role as him within the branch, and accountable as the individual 
whom is seen as the lone decision-maker when taking action. There have been cases of 
successful Executive actions, such as Abraham Lincoln’s presidency during the Civil 
War, but each usage of Executive discretionary authority results in furthering the 
precedent of when it can be utilized. President Obama recently decided that because 
224 Wilson, Woodrow, “Constitutional Government in the United States”, Columbia University Press, 1908, 
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Congress has been unable to pass legislation regarding a skewed and inefficient 
immigration system, he would issue an Executive order over the constitutional separation 
of powers that basically usurps an explicitly congressional power of law-making from 
Congress. While the immigration system is widely thought of in this manner of 
negativity, and generally thought to be in need of reform, the implications of Obama’s 
decisions are far more important. 
 For those that support the presidency’s usage of Executive prerogative, both 
currently and in the past, there is a general belief that the President of the United States 
should be given freedom to act energetically when the nation is in need of action. Being 
elected by the people gives the position the power to act, and be held accountable, by its 
constituents and other institutions of government in this mindset supports this train of 
thought. Wilson continues, when writing about the American presidency, by saying, “The 
President is at liberty, both in law and conscience, to be as big a man as he can. His 
capacity will set the limit; and if Congress be overborne by him, it will be no fault of the 
makers of the Constitution—it will be from no lack of constitutional powers on its part, 
but only because the President has the nation behind him, and Congress does not” 
(Wilson, 70). There are others that prescribe to the belief that no matter the time, there 
will be scenarios in which the rule of law will not be apt to solve all problems that the 
issue will face, both domestically and internationally. Their view is that the Executive 
must have the ability to act without the approval of the laws because if every action of the 
President must be preauthorized by the laws, then the constitutional order becomes a 
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legalistic order that is no longer constitutional225. Woodrow Wilson clearly is under this 
school of thought, as he says, “But the Constitution of the United States is not a mere 
lawyers’ document: it is a vehicle of life, and its spirit is always the spirit of the age. Its 
prescriptions are clear and we know what they are; a written document makes lawyers of 
us all, and our duty as citizens should make us conscientious lawyers, reading the text of 
the Constitution without subtlety or sophistication but life is always your last and most 
authoritative critic” (Wilson, 69-70). This presidentialist view rests upon the ambiguities 
of the Constitution, as when read through a textualist lens, there clearly is not an 
illimitable freedom in the Executive office. But, when viewing the document arbitrarily, 
many further uses of power can be ascertained utilizing Wilson’s, and many others’, view 
of the Constitution.   
The modern presidency of strong Executive leadership was created by Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt, and now many American’s see this as the norm in the position226. In 
the context of President Obama’s Executive actions, the people within this frame of 
thought would approve because of the power of the position that has manifested since 
FDR. His goal of furthering a policy initiative, versus dealing with an existential crisis, 
over the Legislative branch has been accepted, and preceded by, many previous leaders 
of the United States. A President cannot seriously expect to persuade Congress to pass 
more than a fragment of his/her Legislative program and the platform with which he/she 
ran on, causing the Executive to be forced to consider alternative ways of getting 
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legislation passed227. Wilson, an Executive leader known for advocating for expansive 
Executive authority, writes, “There are illegitimate means by which the President may 
influence the action of Congress. He may also overbear Congress by arbitrary acts which 
ignore the laws or virtually override them. He may even substitute his own orders for acts 
of Congress which he wants but cannot get” (Wilson, 71). When looking at this 
quotation, a major question arises: what is the President of the United States unable to do 
to those of this mindset? According to Wilson in his writings, the President basically does 
not abide by any separation of powers principles whenever he feels the desire, as the 
energetic Executive is one that can overcome any limits upon his power no matter the 
situation. The fact that the question regarding the presidency’s potential unlimited power 
exists is precisely why the Founding Fathers decided to utilize a constitutional 
government that operates under the rules of written law.  
Madison, and all of the other great men at the Constitutional Convention, 
articulated the system of checks and balances precisely so that one branch couldn’t usurp 
the power of another, as President Obama is currently doing by taking over the law-
making process with his Executive decree. Constitutional government was created in the 
United States to limit the dangers of tyranny, but as of late, Presidents have been 
overstepping their prescribed powers on a more consistent basis. President George 
Washington and President Abraham Lincoln, the drivers behind the Proclamation of 
Neutrality Executive order and the Civil War Secession Crisis Executive orders, 
respectively, are the original examples of leaders of the United States overstepping their 
constitutional grounds to issue a decree utilizing their Executive authority; however, both 
227 Hodgson, 15 
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of these examples had much more justification through both the inherent roles of the 
Executive and the situation that the presidents were faced with. Washington, because the 
treaty-making power is on the foreign front, and may require swift Executive action, was 
able to justify his usage of Executive discretion to declare neutrality in France during the 
war that was occurring at the time in Europe. Lincoln, on the other hand, was faced with 
a domestic existential crisis, and therefore was justified in using his prerogative by acting 
on the necessity of the preservation of the Union. While these examples may have been 
necessary at the time, they were the first successful examples of prerogative, and they set 
the scene for future, less justified exercises and expansions of Executive discretionary 
authority. 
In recent history, the Executive orders issued, especially those by President 
George W. Bush, struggle to meet the necessity or existential standards that Washington 
and Lincoln were able to meet when deciding to utilize their power to overstep the 
separation of powers. Bush, in the foreign realm, utilized his Office of Legal Counsel to 
ignore multiple treaties and agreements made regarding the treatment of prisoners and 
their ability to be extradited to countries that have a history of using torture to obtain 
information. In truth, Bush’s violation would not have been entirely unjustified if his 
actions had just remained on the foreign realm, because we had been attacked on 
September 11, 2001, and he had the opportunities to operate as the extreme Executive 
because of that. However, after Bush declared a “’War’ on Terror”, he utilized the fact 
that the United States was in an undefined, unquantified, and ambiguous enemy that 
could basically be construed to mean that the country was at war with millions of people 
from many different countries. Following from this, the administration then outlined legal 
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claims that he could utilize his Executive prerogative to institute the NSA wiretapping of 
American citizens. He was successfully able to change the language of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act from “primary purpose” to “significant purpose” of 
information gather to be national security, which lowered the standards of the Act 
substantially, allowing for near-unlimited wiretapping of United States citizens228. Bush, 
throughout this process, sought out the approval of Congress by attempting to legally 
justify his actions through the Founding Fathers’ words and the argument that it was 
within the extraordinary constitutional presidential war powers, primarily Alexander 
Hamilton, and was able to achieve some validation for his actions. 
President Obama, in his Executive order regarding immigration reform, did not 
look for any validation from Congress, as he understood that there would be absolutely 
no realistic chance for him to do so and he made no attempt in claiming the nation is in 
crisis. He previously has made multiple attempts even from his time in the Legislative 
branch to reform immigration law by passing bills; unfortunately, the congressional 
process is complicated due to the number of committees, subcommittees, and varieties of 
individual interests and egos that have to be accommodated for in one way or another 
create a near impossible likelihood that a full bill will be passed without amendments 
being made229. In the document published by the Department of Justice articulating the 
legal backing that Obama has, it says, “Prosecutorial discretion—the power of the 
Executive to determine when to enforce the law—is one of the most well-established 
traditions in American law. Prosecutorial discretion is in, in particular, central to the 
228 Kleinerman, “The Discretionary President”, 226 
229 Hodgson, 119-120 
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enforcement of immigration law against removable noncitizens. As the Supreme Court 
has said, ‘The broad discretion exercised by immigration officials’ is ‘[a] principal 
feature of the removal system’ Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 
(2012)”230. The letter continues, “There are, of course, limits on the prosecutorial 
discretion that may be exercised by the Executive Branch. We would not endorse an 
Executive action that constituted an abdication of the President’s responsibility to enforce 
the law or that was inconsistent with the purposes underlying a statutory scheme. But 
these limits on the lawful exercise of prosecutorial discretion are not breached 
here…Both the setting of removal priorities and the use of deferred action are well-
established ways in which the Executive has exercised discretion in using its removal 
authority. These means of exercising discretion in the immigration context have been 
used many times by the Executive branch under President of both parties, and Congress 
has explicitly and implicitly endorsed their use”231. Further justification exists from 
scholars, as they say that because Congress does not appropriate nearly enough money to 
deport all of the 11 million undocumented immigrants estimated to be living in the 
United States, the President has the ability to choose whom he deports, so he cannot 
reasonably accused of usurping lawmakers’ authority by issuing the Executive order232. 
While this is not the detailed edition of the legal justifications, the pure validity that it is 
given because of who has signed off on the letter (10 prominent legal scholars at top law 
schools and undergraduate universities such as University of Chicago, Duke University, 
230 “Scholars Letter on Immigration”, Scribd 
231 “Scholars Letter on Immigration”, Scribd 
232 Davis, “Obama’s Immigration Action has Precedents, but May Set a New One” 
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and Yale University233) will give Obama’s argument staying power to the people and to 
others analyzing his usage of prerogative. These justifications will appeal strongly to the 
masses, as the name recognition of the prestigious universities and positions that these 
scholars undertake will overcome the official argument, which, when analyzed, does not 
circumscribe the fact that Obama clearly overstepped the separation of powers. However, 
as defined in the Lincoln/Bush chapter, a successful usage of prerogative power is one 
that is undertaken out of necessity, during a time of crisis, and justifiable to the people—
Obama’s usage of his Executive authority does not pass this test. 
Previous Presidents who utilized their Executive authority to shield, or at the very 
least assist, undocumented immigrants have not been faced with the criticisms that 
President Obama faces currently because their actions were not as substantial in terms of 
the pure number of people affected and the polarization of the issue at the time. For 
instance, in 1986, President Reagan signed the Amnesty Bill passed by Congress that 
granted legal status to three million undocumented immigrants, and then acted on his 
own, without congressional approval, to expand it even more within the next year234. 
However, because Reagan initially signed a bill passed by the Legislative branch before 
using his Executive authority on his own, he was much less maligned. In addition to 
Reagan, President George H.W. Bush, in 1990, moved to allow 1.5 million 
undocumented spouses and children of immigrants whom were in the process of 
becoming permanent residents to stay in the country to obtain work permits—This 
number was about 40% of the undocumented population, while Obama’s actions in 2014 
233 “Scholars Letter on Immigration”, Scribd 
234 Davis, “Obama’s Immigration Action has Precedents, but May Set a New One” 
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affects about 45% of the undocumented population235. Due to the lack of polarization on 
the issue at the time, and the other issues that were capturing the United States’ attention, 
there was no backlash against either of the presidents at the time, and the constitutionality 
of the decision faded to the background. Further, these exercises of Executive prerogative 
should not be deemed acceptable, just as Obama’s is not constitutional. 
Those that are not in support of Obama’s usage of prerogative have taken to 
vocalizing their disapproval, and some of these people have worked closely with the 
current President in the past. The primary issue, and the one that is absolutely the most 
compelling as to why President Obama is wrong in issuing this Executive order, is the 
purposeful existence of the separation of powers, and his usurpation of Legislative 
explicit authority. The power to legislate, and pass laws, is entirely and explicitly 
prescribed to Congress in Article I of the Constitution, which, in my opinion, allows the 
Legislature, and only the Legislature, to create legislation. Clearly, past Presidents, and 
now Obama, have been attempting to circumscribe their constitutionally given powers, 
but I do not agree that any of them have succeeded in justifying their attempts without an 
existential crisis or true war. The United States’ government is entirely based around the 
system of checks and balances, and the idea that ambition must counteract ambition, yet 
in recent history, individual ambition in the Executive has been overcoming collective 
ambition within the Legislative branch. This has been done through the ambiguous 
citations of constitutional text, and past precedents, so as to continue the expansion of 
Executive authority prior to Obama, although Obama makes no attempt at justification 
out of necessity. George W. Bush’s administration was unsuccessful in passing an 
235 Davis, “Obama’s Immigration Action has Precedents, but May Set a New One” 
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immigration system overhaul through the Senate, and was then told that the President 
couldn’t reshape the system through Executive prerogative by his own legal team236. In 
other words, Bush, a President who didn’t hesitate to create the “’War’ on Terror” and 
utilize it to expand Executive power domestically and internationally, forfeited the idea 
of immigration reform and moved on for his last 18 months in office237. The President 
preceding Obama, who is known as one of the most expansive Executive regimes in the 
history of the United States, could not find the legal justification for overhauling the 
immigration reform, even after discovering a method to institute the NSA wiretapping 
upon the United States’ citizens. The United States has survived, and flourished, on the 
words and meanings of the Constitution for its entire history, but Obama is in the process 
of venturing down the path of straying from the Constitution’s explicitly prescribed 
powers for the co-equal branches in his actions regarding immigration. 
Not only does the initial violation of the constitutional system create a major 
issue, the precedent that President Obama has now set in regards to expansive Executive 
prerogative powers is even more dangerous. Precedence is entirely what the Founding 
Fathers’ feared, as the more expansive precedents already set become, the easier it 
becomes for the current President to expand even more on the Executive’s authority to 
act unilaterally. David Martin, a University of Virginia law professor who was a counsel 
at the Department of Homeland Security in 2009 and 2010, has said that beyond the 
question of whether Obama was staying within the bounds of his constitutionally 
236 Collinson, Stephen, “On immigration, a tale of two presidents”, CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/20/politics/obama-immigration-bush/index.html?hpt=po_c1, November 21, 
2014 
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prescribed power (which he isn’t), the issue for the future is the precedent set because 
even if his directive is legally defensible, it is paving the way for future presidents to act 
to contravene laws238. The past has shown how one initial precedent, meaning the one set 
by Abraham Lincoln, may be acceptable at the time, but has now slowly allowed for the 
Executive power to continue to grow as uses of it become more common and frequent. 
Lincoln’s usage of Executive prerogative, unlike Obama’s, was actually to combat an 
extraordinary and existential crisis, the Civil War. The War crisis posed a direct threat to 
the persistence of the Union and endangered the people, which in turn gave validation to 
the uses of Executive authority. In our current system, there is no absolute existential 
threat to the persistence of the United States, and no direct threat to the population, that 
results from the faulty immigration system.  
Using this logic, President Bush, when acting in the “’War’ on Terror”, was more 
justified in using his prerogative because there was at least some sort of threat to the 
population and the nation, whereas Obama, if anything, has placed the people more in 
danger by potentially allowing criminals to remain in the United States. American 
citizens have also realized this fear, as Sheriff Joe Arpaio, who frequently butted heads 
with the federal government over the treatment of undocumented immigrants in Arizona, 
claimed immediately after Obama’s Executive order that he would be suing the 
President239. Arpaio was quoted saying by a group called “Freedom Watch”, which 
released news of the suit, “among the many negative effects of this Executive order, will 
238 Davis, “Obama’s Immigration Action has Precedents, but May Set a New One” 
239 Mandaro, Laura, “Arizona’s Arpaio sues Obama on immigration”, USA Today, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/11/21/arpaio-sues-obama-immigration-
reform/70045742/, November 21, 2014 
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be increased release of criminal aliens back onto streets of Maricopa County, Arizona, 
and the rest of the nation”240. Throughout his usage of prerogative, Lincoln never once 
attempted to legalize it on a consistent basis—rather, he looked for congressional 
validation of his actions, but only for the duration of the crisis, and did not wish for them 
to be ingrained in the Constitution at all times because he understood the dangers that this 
would pose for the federal government in the future. Furthermore, the true dangers that 
the crisis Lincoln was facing posed were mitigated as he utilized his Executive authority 
responsibly and effectively. However, it is totally feasible to fear that a President of the 
United States could be elected into office, at some point in the future, and overhaul entire 
legislative and/or judicial programs that have been in place for hundreds of years, with 
Obama’s action and unique approach in attempting to justify it being another stone in the 
path of moving towards this capability. 
Another contradiction that has come to fruition through Obama’s Executive order 
temporarily reforming immigration law is the purely political sense that the President 
views the issue. In 2007, there was a strong bipartisan congressional effort to push a 
comprehensive immigration package through to President Bush, of which Obama signed 
on to be a part241. On several occasions, Obama, who had by then begun his presidential 
campaign, kept straying from the group’s agreements, as he offered or supported 
amendments that if they passed, may have defeated final passage of the immigration 
bill242. Because of this, many senators that experienced Obama’s flip-flopping find his 
240 Mandaro, Laura, “Arizona’s Arpaio sues Obama on immigration” 
241 Tapper, Jake, “Obama, pushing immigration action today, said to have hurt effort in the past”, CNN, 
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21, 2014 
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frustration over Legislative inactivity seems inauthentic, as he was part of that issue back 
in 2007243. It becomes clear that Obama is in support of certain beliefs on issues when it 
benefits him politically, as immigration does right now in terms of his support within the 
United States—But, when it was politically problematic for him to fully support the 
bipartisan effort, he did what benefitted his political career the most244. Viewing issues 
politically creates far too much subjectivity for a president to be operating with, 
especially when the implications of him utilizing his Executive authority, in this case, 
could potentially change the course of the United States and the power of the President 
forever. 
Even Woodrow Wilson, a strong advocate for an independent and powerful 
Executive to accomplish the ends of modern government, articulates in his President of 
the United States, when speaking of the presidential powers, that the overstepping into 
congressional authority, and explicit usurpation of congressional powers, is condemnable. 
He says, “He may even substitute his own orders for acts of Congress which he wants but 
cannot get. Such things are not only deeply immoral, they are destructive of the 
fundamental understandings of constitutional government, and, therefore, of 
constitutional government itself. They are sure, moreover, in a country of free public 
opinion, to bring their own punishment, to destroy both the fame and the power of the 
man who dares to practice them” (Wilson, 71). The separation of powers principles were 
engraved in the United States’ Constitution to prevent the encroachment, and usurpation, 
of any of the branches upon any others’ powers, and President Obama has done exactly 
243 Tapper, Jake, “Obama, pushing immigration action today, said to have hurt effort in the past” 
244 Tapper, Jake, “Obama, pushing immigration action today, said to have hurt effort in the past” 
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that; usurped the power of the Legislative branch granted in the Constitution through 
issuing this Executive decree, and it would not be approved by any of the original 
creators of the Executive discretionary authority or the separation of powers.  
Constitutionalism, the original idea articulated by John Locke, requires an 
adherence to the rule of law in all circumstances deemed ordinary, such as Legislative 
deadlock, and only allows for the Executive discretion outside of the laws when 
extraordinary circumstances arise. President Lincoln experienced these extraordinary 
circumstances of danger to the Union, but few Presidents since have experienced the 
magnitude of danger that he did when deciding whether or not to utilize his prerogative 
powers. James Madison, the originator of the separation of powers system that our 
government now relies on, created the structure so as to limit Legislative tyranny, but 
also to stop the other branches from acting or encroaching on powers not directly 
constitutionally prescribed to them when not involved in a crisis. Alexander Hamilton, 
while advocating for an energetic Executive, still believed in the constitutional separation 
of powers principals, and in limiting each of the branches so as to stop the usurpation of 
powers unless absolutely necessary for the continuation of the government. These men 
whom all assisted in the creation of the Constitution, and the form of government that the 
United States is under, adhered strongly to the rule of law, but still understood that there 
are circumstances where the rule of law will not have prescribed answers. However, in 
their understandings, these circumstances were of much more intensity and danger than 
simple Legislative deadlock regarding a non-existential domestic issue, such as 
immigration. Obama, utilizing past examples of Presidents acting outside of their 
constitutional powers whom were able to justify their actions at the time, has ignored the 
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rule of law and the powers given to him by the Constitution in a situation that does not 
constitute the President utilizing other branches’ powers out of necessity, and therefore 
his prerogative is not acceptable under the constitutional system of government in the 
United States. Condemning Obama’s usage of this power, and the precedent that will 
now be set for future presidents to expand more of their own Executive power, is an 
absolute necessity if the United States is to stay within the confines of a system of 
separation of powers, and constitutional government, throughout the nation’s future. 
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